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ABSTRACT 
The use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to mobilise private finance is 
increasingly seen as essential to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Numerous development agencies have set up diverse de-risking initiatives to attract 
private investment to development projects and the EU is planning to scale up 
blending support in the near future. Such measures have reportedly been successful 
in raising private finance and in improving development outcomes, but there are 
concerns with this approach. Private shareholders may receive funds at the expense 
of sectors and regions where they are most needed. Funds remain insufficient to plug 
the SDG funding gap. Blending can create longer-term risks for development 
agencies and costs for recipient governments. Traditional evaluations often do not 
capture the full impact of such policies. Furthermore, there is an opportunity cost to 
using ODA in this way and blending may promote the perspective of financial 
investors over development outcomes. 
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Executive summary 
This report considers the effects of using concessional Official Development Assistance (ODA) to ‘de-r isk ’  
development projects in light of European Union (EU) proposals to scale up support for blended 
finance in the forthcoming Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The scope of blended finance has 
expanded substantially over the past decade and attracting private finance is increasingly seen as 
essential to meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, there is considerable 
confusion and disagreement among development agencies as to how it should be defined, measured 
and assessed.  
The report considers different definitions of blending and reviews the evidence on its impact from 
four data sources: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Convergence, 
the Development Finance Institutions (DFI) Working Group and the Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDB) Taskforce on Mobilisation. Estimates of the funds mobilised from blending range from 
USD 38 billion (in 2017) according to OECD to just USD 1.7 billion mobilised from the private sector 
(in 2018) according to the DFI Working Group. Even the top of the range figure of USD 38 billion is 
only a small fraction of the additional USD 2.5 trillion needed each year to achieve the SDGs.  
The main sectors attracting blended finance have been banking and infrastructure. Funds have 
mostly been mobilised for middle income countries. Low income countries and the least developed 
countries (LDCs) have attracted a very small share. The OECD finds that guarantees have been the 
blending mechanism that has mobilised most finance, while the DFI Working Group finds that senior 
debt has led to the highest value of concessional commitments.  
The EU established a number of regional blending facilities between 2007 and 2013 and the 
External Investment Plan (EIP), adopted in 2017, set out to further mobilisation of private and public 
investments. The European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), effectively the financing arm of 
the EIP, delivered part of this investment. Part of the rationale for its establishment was to promote 
investments in fragile states in order to stem migration.  
What, then, can be learned from the empirical literature on blended finance? Despite inevitable 
challenges due to the discrepancies in measurement and data, some common themes are discernible, 
although the evidence is far from clear-cut. Considerable policy attention is devoted to the notion of 
financial leverage when it comes to blending. However, this figure varies depending on the 
methodology used. While some claim that every USD invested by donors has leveraged investment in the 
range of USD 9 or higher, research by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) found the figure was 
much lower and as low as USD 0.37 in low income countries (LICs). Blended finance thus does not 
necessarily generate substantial private inflows. Furthermore, it can create specific liabilities for recipient  
country governments.  
There are concerns regarding the ownership of blending projects, as there is little evidence of 
developing country government participation in decision-making processes. The expansion of blended 
finance has elevated the role of DFIs in development policy. While these have development-oriented 
mandates, they need to protect their creditworthiness. They have diverse mandates, some with the 
explicit objective of promoting their own countries’ business interests.  
The EU conducted an extensive review of its blending facilities in 2016. While painting an overall 
positive picture of blending, this evaluation highlights a number of caveats regarding the challenges of 
impact assessment. While mechanisms such as logical frameworks are in place to monitor outcomes, 
there is little space to consider the broader impact, for example, on poverty reduction and climate 
change mitigation. The evaluation points out that developmental results cannot be assumed. 
Nevertheless, the evaluators do so in many instances.  
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Achieving positive results with blended finance in low income and fragile states raises specific 
challenges with, for example, weak institutions and high perceived risk. The LDCs have attracted the 
lowest amounts of blended finance. Yet, attracting investment to such locations is considered to be 
essential to achieving the SDGs. The World Bank launched its Private Sector Window (PSW) in 2017 with 
the objective of bringing private finance to fragile states. However, amounts disbursed have been low 
and operations have been resource intensive. The World Bank, as well as other development agencies ,  
have run into difficulties in assessing additionality and evaluating concessionality. 
Drawing on this extensive background, the report turns to consider blending anticipated under the EU 
MFF 2021-2027. The essence of the MFF reforms is to streamline the complex and fragmented EU 
external action structures, and to upscale support for blending via the expanded EFSD+ and the 
External Action Guarantee (EAG). The report raises a number of concerns regarding these proposals. 
First, there are questions regarding transparency and accountability of financing instruments 
under the next MFF. While part of the rationale for the new structure was to overcome the r igidity and 
complexity of existing mechanisms, the new governance structures are vague. Furthermore, the specific 
amounts to be allocated under guarantees, while substantial, remain unclear.  
Second, blending has attracted grand ambitions that are in stark contrast to the relatively small 
amounts of finance raised. There are fundamental contradictions and inconsistencies, for example, in 
seeking high levels of leverage at the same time as raising investment in high risk locations. These grand 
goals appear disconnected from the reality of projects on the ground. Yet despite this disconnect, there is 
a sense of urgency such that delay to implementation will be costly. Thus, there is apparent  pressure to 
rush through projects that might not be well thought through.  
Third, the likely developmental impact of blending is questionable, particularly in the absence of 
specific targets for the EFSD+, for example, to strengthen the reach into low income contexts. Care needs 
to be taken to ensure that there is adequate commercial expertise to negotiate and monitor investment 
activities both in the EU and in recipient countries. Finally, blending is heavily oriented around 
developing and promoting the private sector. It is important to ensure that blending projects do not 
undermine commitments to promote equitable public services.  
Overall, then, while blending is attracting growing support, this is not on the basis of a robust  empirical 
evidence base. While it has generated additional investment finance, amounts raised have been relatively 
small compared with the size of the financing gap they are supposed to plug and evidence of 
developmental impact is thin. We recommend a radical rethink of the blending assessment methods 
and the overall agenda both for the EU and other developmental agencies.  
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1 Introduction 
This report addresses the use of development funds in de-risking private investment in order to ascertain 
whether blending is effective in delivering development results. Blending uses Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) to make projects sufficiently profitable to attract private and non-concessional 
investment. ODA is used to adjust the risk-return profile to facilitate investment in projects  that  would 
not have otherwise received finance. As a recent Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (2019) Report 
describes: ‘Official development finance is used to provide a subsidy to bring the risk-adjusted rate of 
return in line with the market, increasing the allure of the investment from a private commercial investor  
perspective’ (Attridge and Engen 2019, p 26). For Convergence (2019, p. 31) blended finance (BF) is  ‘firs t  
and foremost a structuring approach’. Parameters that blending might be expected to address  include 
low returns, poor functioning of local markets, and challenging investment climates. To justify the use of 
aid funds in this way, blending projects need to have two essential features. First, the donor funding that 
is used must be crucial to the project in question and second, the project must generate a positive 
developmental impact. Stated differently, there should be both ‘financial’ and ‘development’ 
additionality (Attridge and Engen, 2019). 
Blending is increasingly seen as essential to meet the SDGs and is emblematic of the private turn that has 
characterised development finance since the 2000s. The approach, however, raises a set of issues 
including: what exactly is BF, which actors are involved, how is it measured, what are the underlying 
presumptions regarding beneficiaries, how best to understand its impact. Given divergences between 
development agencies on definition and measurement, and the extensive array of financial 
arrangements in blending transactions, these questions are hard to answer. While many actors, in 
particular donors and financiers, enthusiastically support an expansion of the use of blended finance, via 
groups such as the Blended Finance Taskforce1 others are concerned that there has been insufficient 
regard for the long-term developmental impact of the approach (for example, Attridge and Engen 2019; 
Eurodad 2013; Küblböck and Grohs 2019; GH Advocates 2019). 
This report considers the likely effects of proposals to scale up the EU’s ODA investments in BF under the 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021 to 2027. Our approach considers this from three main 
angles. First, we reflect on the blending landscape more broadly to situate developments in the EU in the 
global context. Secondly, we conduct an extensive review of the empirical literature on blending to 
develop a broader picture of what the broader effects of blending have been, and thirdly we examine 
developments within the EU in more detail.  
The EU is at the forefront of BF and its role has continued to expand, most recently  under the External 
Investment Plan (EIP) and the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD). Data from the 
Development Finance Institutions Working Group (DFI WG) found that the EU was the donor providing 
the largest volume of concessional support for BF (DFI WG 2019, p. 19). The proposals outlined for the 
EU’s next MFF (2021 to 2027) are set to further anchor the EU as a global leader in BF. However, there are 
concerns that the expansion is not fully justified given the weak evidence-base on blending, and the 
need for tight safeguards to ensure that ODA funds are directed to achieving positive developmental 
outcomes (European Parliament 2019a; Concord/Eurodad 2018). 
  
 
1 See http://www.blendedfinance.earth/about , last consulted on 6 February 2020. 
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2 Overview of the Issues 
2.1 Background 
The emphasis on private finance to meet development goals has developed over the years (see Van 
Waeyenberge 2015; and for a review of this literature see Bonizzi et al 2015 and references therein). 
A strong belief in the potential of private flows to finance development has come to prevail, and public or 
official flows have become increasingly deployed in support of private flows. At the global level, the 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) endorsed the push to BF. Paragraph 48 of the outcome document 
epitomised the fundamental shift in the development finance landscape: achieving the 2030 Agenda and 
the SDGs means calling on all sources of finance (UN, 2015)2. For the EU, the 2011 Agenda for Change 
stressed the importance of developing blending mechanisms to boost financial resources for 
development and called for a higher share of EU aid to be deployed through innovative financial 
instruments (EU, 2011). The EU Blending Framework developed to contribute to sustainable growth and 
to increase the impact of EU aid (EC, 2015). 
The rationale for blending stems from an understanding of development constraints in the form of a 
‘financing gap’. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2014) calculated 
an annual financing gap in developing countries of USD 2.5 trillion to achieve the SDGs. A recent 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2020) publication broadly confirmed these figures. It estimates the 
cost of financing the SDGs to be around USD 8 trillion, with domestic resources, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and ODA being able to finance about USD 5 trillion. The remaining USD 3 trillion gap is to be 
financed through private-sector borrowing. While this figure is very large relative to developing 
countries’ economies, it pales in comparison to the wealth held by the private sector in developed 
countries. The USD 2.5 trillion funding gap is less than 1.3 % of the total market capitalisat ion of global 
bond and stock markets of 174 trillion (SIFMA, 2019), and about 3.7 % of the total global bank credit  to 
the private-non financial sector (BIS, 2020). According to Oxfam (2019) the biggest three asset managers  
(Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street) globally managed assets with a value of USD 11 trillion, which is  
equal to the GDP of the Euro area in 2016. The resources of global financial markets, in sum, dwarf the 
SDG financing gap.  
In a world where capital markets are complete and free of impediments, these resources  would flow to 
where their expected returns are higher, (Lucas 1990). In this context, global capital markets would see 
SDGs as a clear high-return opportunity to promote capital (including human capital) development in 
developing economies, and quickly fill this ‘financing gap’. However, as decades of literature have shown, 
financial markets are far from complete and frictionless (see Claessens and Kose 2017 for a 
comprehensive review). Therefore, a mismatch between financing supply and demand exists, especially  
in the context of financing for development, where problems such as asymmetric information are 
particularly likely to be pervasive, given the complexity and high-risk of many development projects. This 
is even more acute in the case of financing for developing countries' small and medium enterprises 
 
2 ‘We recognise that both public and private investment have key roles to play in infrastructure financing, including through 
development banks, development finance institutions and tools and mechanisms such as public-private partnerships, blended 
finance which combines concessional public finance with non-concessional private finance and expertise from the public and 
private sector, special-purpose vehicles, non-recourse project financing, risk mitigation instruments and pooled funding 
structures. Blended finance instruments including public-private partnerships serve to lower investment-specific risks and 
incentivise additional private sector finance across key development sectors led by regional, national and subnational 
government policies and priorities for sustainable development. For harnessing the potential of blended finance instruments for 
sustainable development, careful consideration should be given to the appropriate structure and use of blended finance 
instruments.’ (paragraph 48) 
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(SMEs), which typically lack the means to signal their creditworthiness and the channels to provide 
transparent information about their activities. 
The official rhetoric portrays blending as addressing this mismatch, and as a means to direct pools of 
finance to where it is most needed. However, Oxfam (2017) suggests that blending is associated with 
more complex and mixed motives. For example, blending can be used to justify the use of ODA to 
support large investment projects in middle income countries. It also can promote domestic commercial 
interests as blending may benefit companies in OECD countries. This may incentivise a form of ‘t ied’ aid 
(Oxfam, 2017). Just over half of EU aid contracts (51 %) were awarded to companies registered in the EU 
(GH Advocates, 2019). Blending has been however criticised for putting excessive emphasis  on pr ivate 
sector needs at the expensive of public sector alternatives (Attridge and Engen 2019; Oxfam, 2017). 
Raising private finance has thus become elevated such that it is a development objective in its own r ight  
(see also Bonizzi et al, 2015).  
The World Bank has an evaluation system in the form of a ‘scorecard’ with points allocated for a wide 
range of outcomes. One of these is ‘private investments catalysed’ which is an indicator of the 
organisation’s performance, on a level equivalent to other more traditional development goals  such as  
roads constructed, area provided with irrigation services and teachers recruited and trained etc.  (World 
Bank, 2016, p. 28). Via the Hamburg Principles (G20, 2017b) the multilateral development banks  (MDBs) 
pledged to review their incentives ‘for crowding-in private sector resources’ in development as follows 3:  
‘MDBs will periodically review and strengthen their internal incentives for crowding-in and catalysing 
commercial finance, while ensuring that those incentives do not reduce the focus on quality and the 
responsiveness to the unique and evolving needs of their borrowing member countries towards the 
SDGs’. The SDG 17.17.1 target indicator seeks to measure progress on the basis of the ‘amount of US 
dollars committed to public-private and civil society partnerships’, with the World Bank assigned as  the 
agency responsible for collecting the data.  
Reflecting the idea to increase resources available for development by using donor funds to mobilise 
finance and investment from the private sector (instead of increasing public resources), the OECD has 
sought to develop a new international statistical measure ‘to track resources invested to achieve the 
SDGs’ (DAC 2017, p. 1). This indicator, termed ‘Total official support for sustainable development’ (TOSSD) 
seeks to include those official resources targeted at mobilising private sector development finance. 
This would seek to capture the leveraging effect of ODA, BF packages and risk mitigation instruments 4.  
As such, TOSSD seeks explicitly to include private resources mobilised through official development 
finance (DAC 2017, p. 2).  
2.2 Definitions and measurement 
There is no common definition of BF at the official level and this presents problems in data collection and 
comparability. There is no consistent picture of scale of BF or its development impact (Attridge and 
Engen, 2019). Convergence (2019, p. 44) highlights how: ‘There are as many as 15 blended finance 
definitions publicly available, which collectively describe blended finance as a mechanism, approach, 
instrument, and asset class’. The result is a confusing and inconsistent array of data and claims. For many 
 
3 The level of dedication to attracting private sector is apparent by the changing incentive structures created. Kim (2017) 
discusses the World Bank’s changing incentive structure for its staff to reward mobilisation of private capital: ‘But we’re working 
to change the incentives – defining and tracking the direct mobilisation of commercial capital, so we can reward every effort to 
crowd in private financing. We’re putting in place a tracking system that captures indirect forms of mobilisation, and we’re 
figuring out how to reward staff who focus on advisory programs, building markets, and creating the environment for 
investment’. 
4 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/tossd.htm , last consulted on 6 February 2020. 
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years, the predominant approach was the blending of public concessional resources with public non-
concessional resources (for example, from DFIs). EU blending historically took this form, combining EU 
grants with other public (non-concessional) and some (limited) private resources to support public, 
private or mixed projects. Accordingly, the EU defines blended finance as ‘the strategic use of a limited 
amount of grants to mobilise financing from partner financial institutions and the private sector to 
enhance the development impact of investment projects’ (EC 2015, p. 3). However, according to Attridge 
and Engen (2019, p. 17), the discourse is increasingly oriented around the use of public resources to 
leverage private commercial finance. In view of this variety, this section considers some of the ways in 
which global agencies define and measure blending. 
2.2.1 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
The OECD defines blending as ‘The strategic use of development finance for the mobilisation of 
additional finance towards the SDGs in developing countries, where “additional finance” refers primarily  
to commercial finance that does not have an explicit development purpose. “Development finance” is 
taken to include both concessional and non-concessional resources’ (OECD/UNDCF 2019, p. 17). This is an 
expansive definition including, for example, technical assistance. Reporting on amounts mobilised from 
the private sector has been part of the regular OECD DAC data collection since 2017. Before then, data 
was collected through ad-hoc surveys of five blending instruments: guarantees, syndicated loans, shares 
in collective investment vehicles, direct investment in companies and credit lines. Data collection was 
further enriched in 2018 by adding Special Purpose Vehicles and simple co-financing such as Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs) (OECD/UNCDF, 2019). The OECD (2019) reported that the amount mobilised 
from the private sector over the six years from 2012 to 2017 comes to USD 157.2 billion. Guarantees 
accounted for 40 % of finance mobilised from 2012-2017 (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Private financed mobilised by mechanism source (2012-2017) 
  
Source: OECD, 2019   
Credit lines
16%
Simple co-
financing
2%
Direct 
Investment in 
companies
17%
Shares in CIVs
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In 2017 (the most recent figures publicly available), the OECD reported that USD 38.2 billion was 
mobilised from blending, and most of this (64 %) went to Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs)5, with 
Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs) accounting for 28 %. Only 6 % went to Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) (OECD, 2019a).  
Figure 2: Amounts mobilised by income group, 2017, USD Billion  
 
Source: OECD 2019a, p. 3  
The sectors that receive most finance from blending are energy and banking, together accounting for  
60 % of private finance mobilised. Social infrastructure accounted for just 7 %. Most of the finance raised 
was mobilised by multilateral organisations (72 %) as compared to 28 % mobilised by bilateral providers .  
The US was the main bilateral mobiliser and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
accounted for the largest share of multilateral mobilisation (USD 5.7 billion) closely followed by European 
Investment Bank (EIB) (USD 5.1 billion). 
2.2.2 Convergence  
Convergence is a non-profit membership organisation funded by a variety of actors such as the 
Government of Canada, Citi Foundation and Ford Foundation. Convergence describes itself as ‘the global 
network for blended finance’, generating ‘data, intelligence and deal flow’. Membership is diverse 
including the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Credit Suisse and the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation. They define BF as ‘the use of catalytic capital from public or philanthropic sources  to 
increase private sector investment in sustainable development’6.  
Their approach to calculating BF differs from the OECD. As the OECD/UN Capital Development Fund 
(UNDCF) (2019, p. 18) highlights - for any transaction to be included in the Convergence database, it must 
‘use concessional capital (public or philanthropic), whereas the OECD’s scope extends to all development 
finance, independent of the terms of its deployment’. Another difference is in the source material. 
Convergence collects information from ‘credible public sources (e.g. press releases, case studies ,  news 
articles) as well as through data sharing agreements and validation exercises with its members’ 
(OECD/UNDCF, 2019, p. 18). Convergence data captures total deal size including the development 
finance deployed (OECD/UNCDF, 2019), rather than just the finance mobilised, hence the BF data appear  
to be considerably larger than indicated by any other source. For 2018, Convergence reports 
489 transactions closed and USD 136 billion capital committed for developing countries, and 
USD 122 billion in 2017, compared with the OECD figure of USD 38.2 billion in 2017. 
OECD reports that the region that attracted the greatest share of BF in 2017 was America with 25 %, 
followed by Africa (19 %), Asia and Oceania (19 %), Europe (18 %) with the remaining either global or 
unspecified. Convergence has different regional reporting and finds that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
 
5 The DAC list of ODA recipients comprises Least Developed LDCs, and ‘other low income countries’ which have GNI per capita 
below USD 1 005; LMICs which have per capita GNI above the LIC threshold and below USD 3 995; UMICs with per capita GNI 
between the LMIC threshold and below USD 12 375. Countries with GNI above this are High Income Countries. The OECD DAC 
lists 47 LDCs (and two ‘other low income countries’ DPR of Korea and Zimbabwe); 37 LMICs and 57 HMICs (DAC, 2018).  
6 See http://www.convergence.finance/blended-finance , last consulted on 6 February 2020. 
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accounted for 35 % of BF transactions (their publicly reported data do not show the value of amounts  
mobilised by region). They also find that energy and financial services account for the highest number of 
transactions, accounting for 24 % and 22 % of BF transactions respectively 7. 
2.2.3 MDBs and DFIs definitions 
MDBs and DFIs also compile data on blending, using a narrower definition of BF. According to the DFI 
Working Group8, BF is ‘Combining concessional finance from donors or third parties alongside DFIs’ 
normal, own account finance and/or commercial finance from other investors, to develop private sector 
markets, address the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and mobilise private resources’  (DFI WG, 
2017, p. 4). In this definition, blending necessitates the application of concessional resources alongside 
other official flows with the explicit purpose to develop private sector markets and mobilise private 
resources. This differs from the OECD definition, which does not require the use of concessional resources 
for blending. 
Concessionality may take the form of (i) interest rates below those available on the market; (ii)  maturity , 
grace period, security, rank or back-weighted repayment profile that would not be accepted/extended by 
a commercial financial institution; and/or (iii) the provision of financing to borrower/recipients not 
otherwise served by commercial financing. In contrast to the OECD, the DFI WG draws a distinction 
between funds mobilised directly and indirectly 9 and their methodology (as with OECD) is being 
continually refined. The DFI WG reports on the total projects financed under blending arrangements, 
breaking this down to show the elements that make up the total. DFI funding is treated separately ,  as  is  
the private sector finance mobilised. 
Overall, they find that, in 2018, DFIs and donors financed projects with a total value of more than USD 6 
billion using resources of USD 1.1 billion in concessional funds and USD 2.4 billion in DFI’s  own account  
resources. Private sector finance mobilised for these projects was about USD 1.7 billion. The remaining 
USD 0.8 billion was comprised of ‘other public/private concessional contributions’ and ‘public 
contribution’ (DFI WG 2019, p. 10). The shares of financing, by region, are shown in Figure 3 (DFI WG, 
2019). There was an apparent reduction from 2017 when total DFI-financed project volume was 
USD 8.8 billion and USD 3.9 billion was mobilised from private sector sources (DFI WG, 2018). 
This contrasts with the upward trajectory depicted by OECD and Convergence. Notably, the DFI WG data 
provide an indication of the amount of concessional finance being allocated towards blending. In 2018 
this was USD 1.1 billion (DFI WG, 2019). 
  
 
7 See http://www.convergence.finance/blended-finance , last consulted on 6 February 2020. 
8 This is a group of Development Finance Institutions composed of: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian 
Development Bank (AsDB), the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the European Development Finance Institutions (EDFI), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Inter-
American Bank Group (IDBG), the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector (ICD) and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). 
9 Private Direct and Indirect Mobilisation are defined in the MDB methodology although the distinction is not entirely clear. 
Private Direct Mobilisation refers to ‘financing from a private entity on commercial terms due to the active and direct 
involvement of an MDB leading to commitment’. Indirect mobilisation refers to ‘financing from private entities provided in 
connection with a specific activity for which an MDB is providing financing, where no MDB is playing an active or direct role that 
leads to the commitment of private finance’ (World Bank 2019b, p. 13).  
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Figure 3: Total DFI Blended Concessional Finance Project Value by Region 
 
Source: DFI WG, 2019, p. 5 
The report thus puts a considerably smaller value on blending operations but seeks to highlight the 
extent of private finance mobilisation and the role of concessional resources therein. As with the OECD, 
infrastructure and finance are the sectors that attract most BF (although the OECD narrows it  down to 
energy). In contrast with the OECD, the DFI WG find that senior debt (rather than guarantees) has been 
the instrument that mobilised the most private sector finance (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: New concessional commitments by instrument, 2018 (USD million) 
 
Source: DFI WG (2018) 
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In common with the OECD, the main locations for the BF projects were middle income countries 
(Figure 5).  
Figure 5: New concessional commitments by income level and sector, 2018 (USD million)  
 
Source: DFI WG (2018) 
In 2019, for the first time, the DFI WG collected data on the volume of concessional support from various 
development partners. They found that the two development agencies that contributed the most 
support for concessional finance in blending operations were the EU and Canada (Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Key donors for DFI Blended Concessional Finance in 2018  
 
Source: DFI WG 2019, p. 19 
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2.2.4 The Multilateral Development Bank Taskforce on Mobilisation 
The MDB Taskforce has also compiled data on blending using a similar approach to the DFI Working 
Group (MDB/EDFI 2018). They find that the majority of finance (92 %) was mobilised by MDBs with 8 % by 
DFIs. The largest was the IFC at 17.8 % of finance mobilisation, followed by the European Development 
Finance Institutions (EDFI) (8.6 %), EIB (7.3 %) and World Bank (7.1 %). Very little finance reached the 
poorest countries (Table 1)10. 
 
Table 1. Total private finance mobilised by income 
group in 2018 (in USD billion) 
   Direct  Indirect  Total   
HIC  25.7  65.8  91.5  
MIC  17.8  46.1  63.9  
LIC  2.3  3.2  5.5  
LDC  0.6  0.1  0.7  
  46.4  115.2  161.6  
Source: MDB. EDFI (2018). See MDB/EDFI (2018) for more on differences between methodologies for measuring private 
investment mobilisation. 
BF comes in an extensive array of financing mechanisms, ranging from large infrastructure to micro loans 
and currency hedging. Differences in measurement and categorisations raise difficulties in compiling an 
accurate account that can be useful for policymakers. The measurement approaches can lead to 
diverging conclusions. For example, while the OECD reports that most private finance has been 
mobilised by guarantees followed by syndicated loans, the DFI WG reports that most funds have been 
raised through debt followed by equity. Financing structures are often layered, with numerous 
institutions adding complexity. Combined with different measurement tools, as well as the need for 
commercial confidentiality for private investors, this raises significant challenges for data collect ion and 
assessment. 
 
10 The MDB/EDFI report uses the World Bank Atlas Method of country categorisation. For their 2018 report, low-
income countries are defined as those with GNI per capita of USD 995 or less in 2017; middle-income c ountries a re 
those with a GNI per capita between USD 995 and USD 12 055; high-income economies a re thos e with a  GNI  per  
capita of USD 12 056 or more. See more information at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/ 
articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups. 
There are currently 47 countries on the l ist of LDCs that is reviewed every three years by the Committee for 
Development and, for 2018, 34 LIC countries (MDB/EDFI, 2018, p.49). 
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3 Blended Finance in the EU 
3.1 EU Development Policy milestones 
There have been several landmark policy milestones in EU development cooperation. In 2005, the 
European Consensus on Development was agreed between the European Parliament, the European 
Commission and the EU member states, setting out the objectives of development cooperat ion. This  
reaffirmed commitments to allocate 0.7 % of the Gross National Income (GNI) on ODA, and to work 
towards poverty eradication and sustainable development, according to principles of aid effectiveness. 
While outlining a commitment to increase private sector involvement, there is hardly a mention of 
innovative financing, and the 2005 Consensus does not mention blending at all 
Several contemporaneous global developments shaped the direction of subsequent evolutions of 
EU policy, including the SDGs and Climate Change. The policy statement called an Agenda for  Change 
in 2011 refocused EU development policy. It attempted to engage the private sector in order to 
leverage financial resources to deliver public goods. Potential means of carrying this out included grant 
funding and risk-sharing mechanisms to encourage private sector participation. The policy 
commitment was to increase the share of EU financing that would be devoted to blending platforms. 
Besides broadening the scope for the EU to work more closely with the private sector, it  mandates EU 
development cooperation to sharpen its focus on creating conditions to attract foreign investments  by  
structurally transforming the business environment. 
In 2013, EU development policy was reaffirmed in the policy a Decent Life for All which confirmed the 
EU’s commitment to development goals of reducing poverty and addressing the pressing climate 
emergency. This was motivated by the political commitment of the Rio+20 summit in 2012 to develop 
SDGs to succeed the Millennium Development Goals. The commitment was to use development aid as  
a catalyst for development including leveraging investment through innovative sources including 
blending. 
Other important developments included, in 2012, the establishment of the EU’s platform for blending in 
External Cooperation. This is significant as it corresponds not only to the objectives laid out in EU 
development (led by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, DG 
DEVCO) but also the DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, responsible for  EU policy  on 
enlargement and the EU's eastern and southern neighbours. Cooperation between financing facilit ies  
and institutions (including the EIB, DFIs and others) sought to amplify the reach of development 
cooperation. 
3.2 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014 to 2020: Agents and 
facilities involved 
Development finance under the existing MFF 2014 – 2020 defines the existing structure of EU blended 
finance. The development funds within the existing MFF came under the section of the budget called 
‘Global Europe’ to which approximately EUR 66 billion was allocated. Global Europe is comprised of funds 
allocated beyond EU borders, only a part of which is ODA according to DAC criteria. The funds allocated 
through the EU budget are therefore under the scrutiny of the European Parliament. These aid funds  are 
delivered through a number of thematic and geographic instruments, as follows:  
Geographic Instruments 
• DCI (Development Cooperation Instrument) 
• IPA (Pre-Accession Assistance Instrument) 
• ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) 
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Thematic Instruments 
• EIDHR (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights) 
• Instrument for Stability 
• Common Foreign and Sec Policy 
• Humanitarian Aid 
• Other 
However, sizeable amounts of aid are also managed under the European Development Fund (EDF), 
which is financed from the contributions of member states and do not fall immediately under the 
purview of the Parliament. This vehicle has been used since 1957 to channel money to Africa and 
Overseas Territories. The budget between 2008 and 2013 was of EUR 22.7 billion and the budget  in the 
recent period (2014 to 2020) is of EUR 30.5 billion. These funds are managed in two distinct ways. 
One way is under EU management, and the other is by the EIB, which manages some of the EDF funds  
on behalf of the Commission. The Cotonou agreement set up a new financing mechanism called the 
Investment Facility (IF). The mandate of the IF is ‘to support private sector development in the ACP 
States by financing essentially – but not exclusively – private investments’ (European Commission, 2013, 
p. 3). 
The EU regional BF facilities were instituted in the 2007-2013 period and carried on to the current  MFF. 
Eight facilities were instituted: 
1. The EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF) was established in 2007 and was superseded by the 
Africa Investment Facility (AfIF) in 2014. Its stated aim was to increase investment in infrastructure 
in SSA by blending long term loans from participating financiers (i.e. EU development financiers 
and the African Development Bank) with grant resources from donors such as grant resources from 
the European Commission and several EU Member States. 
2. The Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) was established in 2008 in order to fulfil the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy. The NIF is designed to create co-financing arrangements – pooling 
together EU budget and EU member states’ funds, together with loans from European Finance 
Institutions to finance projects in countries across the Mediterranean and the near Middle East. 
Only eligible Finance Institutions can receive grant funding from the NIP, which include Multilateral 
European Finance Institutions, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for  
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), the 
Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), and the bilateral national DFIs of member states.  
3. The Western Balkan Investment Framework (WBIF) was established in 2009 to finance projects  in 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. This was 
established primarily as a joint venture between the Commission, the CEB, the EBRD, the EIB , and 
several bilateral donors, which were later joined by the World Bank Group, the Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW) Development Bank and the AFD. 
4. The Caribbean Investment Facility (CIF), was established in 2012. Akin to other regional facilities, 
the Caribbean Investment Facility (CIF) aims to mobilise funds for development, for eligible 
countries. These are 15 Caribbean countries, signatories of ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. The CIF 
prioritises transport, improvement to ICT, better water and sanitation, promotion to prevent 
disasters and mitigation, address social services’ infrastructure needs. 
5. The Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF), established in 2010, combines grants from EU with 
other funds from national and multilateral DFIs, targeting countries in continental Central and 
South America.   
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6. The Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA) was set up in 2010, modelled on the NIF, but focuses  
on five countries in Central Asia. The idea is to blend EU grant funding with loans from financial 
institutions, such as the EIB, the EBRD and national DFIs. The amount that the Commission 
contributes to the IFCA is decided annually. Some instruments used by this facility, such as 
technical assistance and risk capital operations are conducted through the EIB. 
7. Investment Facility for the Pacific (IFP), established in 2012, has the objective of blending grants 
from the EDF with other financing directed to countries in the Pacific. DG DEVCO manages this 
small facility, although it is financed by the EDF. 
8. The Asian Investment Facility (AIF) was established in 2012, with the aim of combining EU grants  
with other sources of financing in order to encourage beneficiary governments and other financial 
institutions to participate in investments. The money comes from the EU’s Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and is managed by DG DEVCO. 
The AfIF – which, as discussed below is now part of the European Sustainable Development Fund - CIF 
and IFP are currently financed by the European Development Fund (EDF) which - in turn - is financed by 
member states outside the scope of the EU Budget. The LAIF, IFCA and AIF are financed by the 
Development Cooperation Instrument. The WBIF is financed by the Instrument of Pre-Accession and the 
NIF is financed by the European Neighbourhood Instrument, all part of the EU budget. A number of 
thematic facilities also use BF, financed by their own budget instruments. 
3.3 Recent developments: EIP and the EFSD 
Some important innovations have occurred since the mid-term review of the 2014-2020 MFF. The 
crucial one was the establishment of the EIP, which was adopted in September 2017 with the ostensible 
objective to promote investment in partner countries in Africa and the European Neighbourhood. 
Its stated aims include contributing to the UN's SDGs as well as leveraging sustainable public and 
private investments to improve economic and social development with a particular focus on decent job 
creation. There is a clear emphasis on private sector development and migration, with BF as the 
mechanism to achieve this. As stated by the EIP, it aims to: 
• contribute to the UN's sustainable development goals (SDG) while tackling some of the root causes 
of migration; 
• mobilise and leverage sustainable public and private investments to improve economic and social 
development with a particular focus on decent job creation. 
This was modelled on the Juncker Plan - investment efforts internal to the EU - which came after a 
decade of EC recommendations of austerity and contractions of key public spending across  member  
states to support financial sectors. These affected development policy in the EU, both because key 
developmental outcomes deteriorated within the EU, as evidenced by increases in poverty, 
unemployment, social exclusion, but also, the European crisis affected aid commitments of member 
states, which declined, in some cases drastically. EU members of the DAC have long provided ODA 
amounts falling far short of their stated commitments. For 2017 – 2018, in most EU member states,  the 
net disbursement of ODA was less than 0.7 % of GNI. For instance, Austria, Belgium and France provided 
less than 0.4 % of GNI, with Portugal and Spain being among those with less than 0.2 % of GNI. Net 
disbursements for DAC countries as a whole was 0.3 % of GNI11. 
 
11 See OECD Development Finance Data, Available here: http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-
development/development-finance-data/.  
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The EIP led to the establishment of a new facility: the EFSD. The EFSD is effectively the concrete 
financing arm of the EIP. For example, one of the motivations behind its creation was to focus on fragile 
states, in order to stem migration. Its goals, beyond tackling migration, include attract ing investment 
and encouraging the private sector to invest where otherwise it would not. The priority areas are 
infrastructure and finance for small businesses, reform of the business environment, and aligning to the 
sustainable development agenda as indicated in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Blending 
mechanisms through the EFSD are the first of three pillars of the EIP. The second and third pillars 
strengthen technical and policy assistance, with the objective to develop further projects that could 
potentially benefit from EU blended financing, as well as more general policy dialogues to improve the 
business and economic environment (EU, 2016). 
Concretely, the EFSD took over the ITF and the NIF, which turned into the AIP (African Investment 
Platform) and NIP (Neighbourhood Investment Platform) for a total budget of EUR 3 billion for its blended 
finance operations. Furthermore, it established a new guarantee instrument, with a budget of 
EUR 1.5 billion, which also provides further risk-sharing tools for development finance projects, in 
addition to the existing guarantee that the EU continued to provide to the EIB. The stated rat ionale for  
the guarantees is to pay back part or all of a loan if borrowers default or incur losses, and to attempt to 
attract financing for initial seed capital (equity for instance). The objective is to guarantee risks in 
investment projects, and incur losses that may arise, and in this way try to get more investors on board. 
The total combined target is to leverage total investment of EUR 44 billion via the EUR 4.5 billion of 
EU funds in the two regions (Africa and Neighbourhood). A variety of types of guarantees have been 
defined and laid out (see the 28 guarantee schemes discussed in European Union, 2019). Delivery of 
these objectives involves cooperation with EU member states’ development finance institutions and 
international development banks. 
The EIP and the EFSD are the cornerstones of the new proposed structure of EU development finance in 
the new 2021-2027 MFF. The structure of blended facility is considerably simplified in the new proposal:  
all regional facilities would fall under an expanded EFSD+, which would entirely be financed by the new 
Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), the largest component 
within the new Heading 6 of the EU budget ‘Neighbourhood and the World’. Within the EFSD+ would 
also be a new External Action Guarantee (EAG), which would replace all existing guarantee systems, and 
would be open to all European development institutions. We discuss this further in section 5.  
3.4 Amounts and allocations 
The total amount provided by all EU blending facilities is shown below in Figure 712. About 
EUR 6.63 billion have been provided by all EU blending facilities in the 2007-2018 period. These 
collectively contributed to finance projects worth EUR 71.27 billion.  
 
12 The materials presented in this section come from the annual reports of the AIP (and its predecessors IFT and AfIF), NIP (and its 
predecessor NIF), WBIF, LAIF, IFP, IFCA, LAIF and CIF. 
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Figure 7: EU contributions for blended finance 
   
Source: Annual reports of EU blended finance facilities. Note: the data is millions of euros.  
The geographical composition is uneven. The African and Neighbourhood facilities dominate the 
allocations with 35.4 % and 34 % of total, respectively, over the whole period, followed by the WBIF with 
16 %. All the other facilities combined count for about 14.6 %. The dominance of the AIF and NIF is 
particularly noticeable in 2017 and 2018, which coincided with the launch of the EFSD, within which 
these two facilities are incorporated. A more fine-grained view reveals that the largest individual recipient 
countries largely comprise countries that are geographically close to the EU. Beside the cross-regional 
and continental projects, the top five recipient countries are Egypt, Morocco, Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Moldova, all with an allocation of over EUR 160 million each. 
Furthermore, Figure 7 reveals how EU contributions for BF have considerably increased. This reflects  the 
large impact of the EFSD, which has administered the AIP and NIP in 2017 and 2018. Over a third of all 
contributions – about EUR 2.2 billion – were made in this period. As Table 2 shows, the average size of the 
EU contribution for projects through the EFSD is EUR 22.79 million, much higher than for all other 
regional facilities, including the African and Neighbourhood ones, prior to their incorporat ion into the 
EFSD. 
Table 2. EU Projects number and size.  
  IFCA  AIF  IFP  LAIF  CIF  NIF  WBIF  ITF-
AfIF-  
EFSD  
N. of 
projects  
29  39  29  46  15  127  172  67  98  
Average 
project 
contrib.  
6.20  6.18  1.00  8.39  8.52  11.57  6.16  9.21  22.79  
Source: Annual reports of EU blended finance facilities. Note: the data for average project size is in millions of Euro. 
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Sectoral allocations are shown in Figure 8. As the figure shows, transport accounts for about 31 % of the 
total blended funds provided by EU facilities over the 2007-2018 period, followed by energy and pr ivate 
sector allocations – which mostly include support for SMEs typically in the form of financial facilities 
being set up, respectively at 26 % and 17 %. All other sectors received less than 10 % of the total 
allocations. 
Figure 8: EU contributions for blended finance by recipient sector 
 
Source: Annual reports of EU blended finance facilities. Notes: The figure are based on the totals for 2007-2018. 
These sectoral allocations are uneven across the various regions. Over 80 % of contributions for transport 
projects are allocated to Western Balkan and SSA countries, while the Neighbourhood countries and SSA 
account for over 80 % of funds devoted to private sector expansion. This latter observation is particularly  
notable, since the EFSD now manages these allocations. Indeed, over EUR 425 million, or over 40 % of the 
total approved contributions of EUR 1.05 billion to the private sector, occurred in the 2017 and 2018 
period under the EFSD. This likely reflects emphasis that the EFSD places on private sector development.  
In terms of support type, investment grants represent the longer-standing and still predominant form of 
assistance. Figure 9 shows that, as of 2018, the EU provided just under EUR 3.3 billion in grants, and that  
they remain the largest component for all the BF facilities. The second most common form of support  is  
technical assistance, with 27 % or about EUR 1.58 billion. Contributions in the form of financial 
instruments, such as guarantees or equity risk capital, so far account for about 14 %, or EUR 840.4 million. 
These are however on the rise, with the EFSD a key actor in this trend. More than 92 % of these more 
direct risk-sharing mechanisms have been provided for the AIP and the NIP in 2017 and 2018. This is a 
direct result of the creation of the EFSD guarantee, which is set up to cover loans, including local currency 
loans, guarantees, counter-guarantees, capital market instruments, any other form of funding or  credit  
enhancement, insurance, and equity or quasi-equity participations (EFSD, 2017).  
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Figure 9: EU contributions by support type 
 
Source: Annual reports of EU blended finance facilities. 
Finally, a noticeable feature for most EU BF projects was the lack of any contribution from private sector  
financiers. The funds mobilised were from MDBs and DFIs. Across the entire 2007-2016 period, there is no 
evidence of private sector financing in the annual reports of the EU facilities. However, this has changed 
with the creation of the EFSD. In the 2017 and 2018 period, 16 projects in Neighbourhood and Sub-
Saharan African countries involved private sector finance, sometimes with sums as reaching up to half of 
the total project value. Table 3 offers a list of those 16 EU projects, together with details on the size of the 
private finance contribution. 
Table 3. EU blended finance projects with private financing, EUR mn 
Name of project  EU 
contribution 
Lead FI  Total 
project 
value  
Other public 
funds  
Private sector 
contribution  
Kenya Agriculture 
Value Chain Facility  
10  EIB  110  none  50  
ElectriFI country 
windows  
85  FMO  285  EDFI and IFI  2001  
EDFI-AGRIfi in Sub-
Saharan Africa  
29.25  FMO  75.5  EDFI, Other 
DFI and IFI  
31.251  
Transferability and 
convertibility facility  
20.17  PROPARCO 289.34  none  32.92  
Climate Investor 
One  
30.7  FMO  270.7  USAID, 
Dutch 
Government 
and others  
114.76  
As-Samra 
Wastewater 
Treatment Plant 
Expansion BOT  
30.80  EBRD  170.69  Yes but 
unspecified  
53.1  
Euro-mediterranean 
University in Fes  
13.57  EIB  147.57  Yes but 
unspecified  
34.9  
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Programme to 
Restart 
Modernisation 
Investment in 
Agriculture (Tunisia)  
10.3  AFD  300.78  Yes but 
unspecified  
196  
Extending the 
EBRD’s Small 
Business Initiative to 
Lebanon, the West 
Bank and Gaza  
5.2  EBRD  6.4  none  1.2  
EU Trade and 
Competitiveness 
Programme in Egypt 
and Jordan EIB 
component  
25.6  EIB  265.6  none  120  
Corridor 
Development and 
Trade Facilitation 
Project (Madagascar) 
40  AfDB  182.38  none  unspecified  
Kampala-Jinja 
Expressway PPP 
project  
91.05  AFD  711.5  AfDB, 
Government 
of Uganda, 
IFIs  
unspecified  
Women's financial 
inclusion facility  
10  KfW  88.7  multiple  unspecified  
Morocco Green 
Economy Financing 
Facility  
21.11  EBRD  197.11  Green 
Climate 
Fund  
unspecified  
SANAD, MENA fund 
for SMEs  
22.44  KfW  182.44  EU, BMZ, 
FMO  
unspecified  
EU4Business - The 
EU local currency 
Partnership Initiative 
(EFSE)  
6.2  KfW  110.2  multiple  unspecified  
Source: EFSD annual reports. Note 1: the figure includes the funds from other public funders. EU contribution and project values 
are in EUR mil. 
However, private actors participate in the projects in many different ways. Some of the complexities of BF 
become evident when going into the details of the financing structures involved, as shown by looking at  
three of the projects in Table 3. Besides the degree to which private co-financing is secured, private 
actors are involved at different points down the line. One example from the projects lis ted in Table 3 is  
the Samra Wastewater Treatment Expansion, financed by the EBRD and blended with an EU investment 
grant. It is an extension of the 2016 BF project funded by the Government of Jordan and the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation relying on the Jordan-based private contractor Samra Wastewater Treatment 
Plant Company Limited. According to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),this  is  the 
first PPP project in Jordan in financing and managing a public infrastructure project (MIGA Website). It 
uses a 25-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) model with other contractors including Infilco Degrémont 
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Inc. (American Utility Company), Suez Environment S.A. (French Utility Company) and Morganti Group 
Inc. (US incorporated construction company). MIGA has guaranteed the investment of Infilco Degrémont 
Inc. and Suez Environment S.A in As-Samra Wastewater Treatment Plant Company Limited13. Another 
example from Table 3 is Climate Investor One (CIO) fund, which is managed by Climate Fund Managers  
(CFM). CFM is a Netherlands-based joint venture between the Dutch Development Bank (FMO) and 
Sanlam InfraWorks. Sanlam Infraworks is also listed in Netherlands, although it is part of the South African 
Sanlam group, itself a diversified financial services group (FinDev Canada, 2018). Finally,  ElectriFI country 
windows have a number of projects. Particularly, they have a project in Ghana in which they work  with a 
German firm, REDAVIA, to help them expand their solar panel leasing business in the country. These three 
examples indicate the degree of different arrangements and layers of intermediation concurrently in 
placethat complicate ascertaining the flow of financing and where possible liabilities may occur. The 
variety of actors and financing mechanisms add to the complexity of blended instruments, their 
evaluation and comparison with other instruments.  
This subsection shows how the creation of the EFSD is a significant milestone in EU BF. Its creation led to 
a much larger deployment of risk-sharing instruments, the amount of EU contributions has been 
substantially scaled up, larger projects are being financed, more projects are allocated to pr ivate sector 
development and the projects have been able to mobilise considerable private financial resources. 
The EFSD+ is effectively taking over almost the totality of EU BF operations (see also Section 5 below), 
so these trends are probably indicative of the direction of travel of EU BF and development policy. 
It is finally important to note that, while not formally part of the EU BF facilities, EIB lending outs ide the 
EU is guaranteed through the External Lending Mandate (ELM). As of 2018, EIB loans outstanding under  
ELM programmes were EUR 16.74 billion (EIB, 2018). However, as these are not formally part of the EU BF 
arrangement, they are not discussed in this report. 
4 Impact and appraisal of blended finance 
4.1 General assessment 
Despite the international promotion and growth of BF, it has attracted significant criticisms. First, a series  
of definitional and methodological shortcomings impede the assessment of blended finance. Second, 
and related to the previous point, due to definitional controversies and lack of reporting standards, what  
counts and what is measured as BF changes across databases and over time (see, for instance, OECD, 
2018). The same applies to the estimates of ODA (or public money, more generally) that is  mobilised in 
blending. Consequently, and through a series of different assessments, concerns have been raised with 
regard to the limited scale of ‘additional’ private finance that has been leveraged through BF (Oxfam, 
2017; as well as Sections 2 and 3 in this report). In other words, as explained by the OECD (2019b p. 17):  
‘In practice, mobilisation [of additional finance] is often assumed rather than observed’. Third, there is  a  
lack of information and transparency regarding often complex blended financing structures, which 
hinders accountability (Attridge and Engen, 2019, EURODAD, 2013). Transparency is also lack ing in the 
specificities, execution and delivery of blended projects. For example, is it often unclear how the pr ivate 
sector partners for BF projects are selected. Development Initiatives (2016, p. 26) highlights that the lack  
of data on immediate beneficiaries (the ‘investees’) of blended finance poses a significant  hurdle in the 
assessment of BF, particularly since blended finance often targets private companies (rather than public 
entities), whether these are domestic, foreign or even international. Fourth, a current challenge in 
 
13 See here for more details: https://www.worldfinance.com/infrastructure-investment/project-finance/as-samra-wastewater-
plant-expansion-continues 
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evaluating blended projects in terms of longer-term impacts is the lack of completed projects from which 
to gather data as well the lack of a consensus on how to identify, measure and evaluate broad socio-
economic and developmental impacts. This is also reflected in this report, as most EU projects that 
include private co-financing in blending are new (post-2017) and on-going (see Section 3). However, and 
fifth, even for completed blended projects, evaluating impacts is difficult, contested and often relies  on 
implicit assumptions and subjective judgment. In general, donors’ and private evaluations , more often 
than not, assume, rather than assess, developmental impacts, and the scarcity of information hinders  
assessment by other organisations (Oxfam, 2017, OECD, 2019b). Finally, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
have raised concerns with regard to the difficulties and implications in aligning commercial and 
developmental priorities, as well as the low levels of ownership by recipient countries. The sections 
below discuss some of these issues in more detail. 
4.1.1 Additionality, leverage ratios and development impact  
As argued previously, the funding gap in international development has been used as  an argument in 
support of the blending agenda. The private sector is seen as an important agent in scaling up necessary  
development finance, and BF is seen as the appropriate mechanism to promote its involvement by ‘de-
risking’ investment projects and increasing risk-adjusted returns. The perceived benefits of blending are 
therefore linked to the role of the private sector in leveraging finance. Besides financing advantages, 
other important benefits are associated with execution of development projects via private companies , 
presumably including job creation and skill transfer. 
These benefits are encapsulated in the notion of ‘additionality’. Two dimensions of additionality have 
been discerned (ODI, 2019). First, financial additionality occurs when public investment results in private 
investment that would not have happened otherwise. Second, development additionality implies 
development impact from commercial interests. The concept, and assessment methodologies for the 
existence of additionality, however, remain vague and contested in the literature (Pereira, 2015, Carter et  
al., 2018). Indeed, the major challenge of additionality is establishing and building a case for concrete 
counterfactuals in cases where the investment tool would not been implemented (see Carter et al., 2018). 
In other words, the case has to be made that private investment would not have been made if it were not  
for the ODA/public funds (i.e. the blending). Development additionality is even more difficult to establish. 
Leveraging and leverage ratios are widely used to highlight the positive aspects of BF. Evidence on 
leverage ratios is mixed and hindered by different estimation methodologies, themselves reflecting 
conflicting definitions of BF. For example, Development Initiatives (2016, p. 8) highlights that: ‘Data from 
CDC, the UK’s bilateral DFI, suggests that every dollar the institution invested in blended finance between 
2012 and 2015 resulted in approximately an additional USD 4.50 in investments from other actors, 
USD 3.50 of which came from private sector investors. The 2015 annual report of SIFEM, the Swiss DFI, 
stated that every dollar it invested mobilised around USD 9.30 of private investment for 2014–2015’. 
However, Attridge and Engen (2019, p. 15) find much lower leverage ratios, also when disaggregated by 
income level of recipient countries and while focusing on private finance specifically: ‘USD 1 of public 
investment by MDBs and DFIs mobilises just USD 0.37 of private finance in LICs, USD 1.06 in LMICs and 
USD 0.65 in UMICs’.  
The size of leverage ratios is of paramount importance in advocacy of and support for BF. Substantial 
leverage is portrayed as a major benefit of BF through its ability to mobilise and leverage private 
investment for international development. Yet the emphasis on leverage ratios needs further scrutiny . 
First, methodologies differ in whether they project ratios of private to public mobilisations (instead of 
including in the numerator various forms of public flows, concessional or non-concessional in support  of 
the private sector). Second, leverage ratios do not reflect causality and are poor measures of financial 
additionality. When a particular amount of private finance is co-invested alongside publicly backed funds, 
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this does not imply that the private investment is ‘additional’ (i.e. that it would not have materialised on 
its own accord, without the public support). Indeed, a high leverage ratio may indicate the opposite, that 
is a large private investment leveraging a small amount of public support (that has no need for it). Third, 
leverage ratios are poor measures of development additionality as they do not reflect the developmental 
aspects of the ‘leveraged’ funds (Attridge and Engen, 2019). Fourth, targeting leverage ratios  may have 
negative effects, with public finance flowing into sectors and/or regions that can attract private capital on 
their own terms, at the expense of others. As is clear from actual amounts invested (as well as  leverage 
ratios), BF towards LICs, fragile states and particularly social sectors is very limited. An emphasis on 
leverage ratios may exaggerate this shortcoming, with detrimental impact on SDGs and poverty and 
inequality reduction in most needed areas, while the bias towards MICs may increase (Carter, 2018, 
Attridge and Engen, 2019, Küblböck and Grohs, 2019). Fifth, the use of ODA for blending has an 
opportunity cost. One dollar of ODA spent on leveraging private finance cannot be spent on something 
else and in the absence of an increase in aid spending, blending can mean a reduction in ODA for 
traditional purposes and the neediest regions (Oxfam, 2017; Meeks et al., 2020). Research by Meeks et  al.  
(2020) explores the opportunity cost of using ODA for what they term private sector instruments  (PSIs ).  
Focusing on a sample of 31 bilateral ODA providers, they find that around 2 % of ODA is being directed 
towards PSIs, although the true share is likely to be much higher given the ambiguities and gaps in 
reporting, and many are planning to scale up the use of ODA in this area. They found that just 6 % of 
sector specific PSI ODA spending was directed towards social and humanitarian sectors compared with 
69 % of conventional bilateral ODI. PSI spending in contrast was more likely to go to projects in 
‘productive’ sectors such as banking and industry. Conventional ODA was also more likely to reach LDCs  
than PSI spending and to focus on social objectives such as gender equality. Thus, decis ions  regarding 
the use of ODA for blending need to consider these opportunity costs fully. Section 4.3 explores  further  
the concern regarding BF and LICs and fragile contexts. 
Developments in the water sector provide insights into the complexities surrounding the developmental 
and equity effects of blending. Estimated annual financing needs in the sector are around USD 112 billion 
and current spending covers only about 15 % of estimated needs (Goksu et al., 2017) so there has 
recently been a push to promote BF (OECD, 2019c, Leigland et al., 2016). To date, water has attracted 
much lower levels of private finance than other types of infrastructure. This is attributed, in part, to weak 
financial performance of water utilities (OECD, 2019c). According to Leigland et al. (2016, p. 3), the water  
sector ‘could offer very good investment opportunities for long term investors such as pension funds or  
insurance companies who need to match the profile of their long term liabilities’. However, the perceived 
risky environment deters investment and this includes inadequate revenue streams.  
The poor financial performance of developing country water utilities is in large part attributed to tar iffs 
that are below cost-recovery levels. Development agencies have long called for tariff increases, arguing 
that any subsidy is regressive because it would typically benefit households that are already connected to 
the network rather than those lacking access to services (OECD, 2019c). Mobilising commercial finance 
for water is seen as essential to achieving SDG6 and raising water tariffs is seen as an essential 
component to facilitating blending (Leigland et al., 2016, p. 8). 
When the full effects of this are unpacked and the complexities of water systems are examined in more 
detail, the policy is potentially problematic. First, using commercial finance is a more expensive way of 
financing water and is likely to be costlier than donor or public funds (Goksu et al., 2017, p. 16).  Second, 
it is not just the wealthy that use piped water as it is often re-sold by water vendors to low income 
households that do not have a water connection (Bayliss and Tukai, 2011). Third, Bayliss (2013) shows 
that raising tariffs to cost recovery levels in a number of African countries would be prohibitively 
expensive relative to income levels generally, and even relative to the incomes of the top quintiles in 
many countries.   
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Essentially, then blending could lead to a situation where pensions are financed by increased water bills  
in developing countries where affordability is questionable. It may be that there are benefits from such a 
system if quality and access are improved but there will likely be significant social costs. The point here is  
that much more care should be taken to analyse individual cases, taking account of the full 
developmental impact, before firm conclusions can be reached on blending. 
4.1.2 New liabilities and the high cost of investments 
The emphasis on BF as a conduit for increased private sector investment often fails to account for the 
level of public costs incurred in attracting private investors. As reported by numerous policy papers 
advocating for BF, greenfield investments in developing countries are particularly risky for private 
investors. Public guarantees mean that in case of crisis the public entity is a ‘first loss  investor ’  (Oxfam, 
2017). The issue of sovereign loans within blending mechanisms in large infrastructure projects is also 
raised in Küblböck and Grohs (2019) particularly within the context of increasing foreign debt in already 
indebted developing countries. External loans in developing countries more than doubled during 2008-
2017 and external debt payments by developing country governments grew by 85 % (as a share of 
government revenue) between 2010 and 2018 (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2019; Küblböck and Grohs, 
2019). Therefore, it is of paramount importance to assess the impact of blended projects on the debt 
structure of recipient countries, as well as their initial debt positions and composition (see UNCTAD 
2017). 
A recent example is that of the Global Financing Facility (GFF). The GFF is not a new fund but a financing 
facility that acts to leverage small amounts of grant resources to attract funding from domestic 
government resources, private sector sources and other IFI resources including the World Bank and the 
International Development Association (IDA). It uses a combination of financing instruments  including 
co-financing, purchasing for performance and BF investments from diverse investors.  It  was  created in 
2015 to support women and children in developing countries, with an aim to end preventable maternal,  
newborn, child, and adolescent deaths. A recent report analysing the impact of the GFF in seven 
countries (Cote d’Ivoire, Guatemala, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda) raises the issue of 
GFF loans contributing towards national country indebtedness (E&K Consulting, 2019). According to this  
research, the GFF carries the potential of adding towards country debt. In Rwanda, for example, the GFF-
catalysed IDA loan has reportedly added 22.5 % to the country’s indebtedness (E&K Consulting 2019, p. 7,  
9). Although more evaluation is required in assessing other BF cases, the risk of added indebtedness  and 
its general impact on poverty alleviation and health spending needs to be monitored carefully (see also 
Mckenna and Rono, 2020). 
4.1.3 Limited Domestic Ownership, low representation of recipient countries and 
conflicting interests 
First, the blending finance modality has been criticised in terms of representation and ownership by 
recipient governments and local actors. This includes concerns regarding the increased prominence of 
DFIs in the development arena. BF promotes DFIs as central players in development finance. These 
organisations have little representation from developing countries and are dominated instead by 
developed countries’ governments (Eurodad, 2013). Furthermore, in many blended facilities there is  no 
requirement for input from recipient governments or other stakeholders (Oxfam, 2017).  Currently ,  the 
few project evaluations conducted internally used very little input from local stakeholders. There are 
recommendations to engage the ‘end beneficiaries’ earlier in the evaluation process (see also OECD, 2018 
p. 149). In the case of the EU, there is no presence of recipient countries in the operational board that 
decides which projects will receive grants nor are local institutions allowed to lead the implementation of 
the project (Mah, 2018). 
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Second, increasing involvement of DFIs may entail tensions between expectations, policies and practices; 
private and social returns in development; and the net effect of projects and the ‘true’ beneficiaries both 
in the short and long run. OECD (2019b) asserts that entrusting the mobilisation of private capital to DFIs, 
as opposed to development agencies, has strategic consequences for the whole development co-
operation approach, as for example, ‘DFIs often focus on supporting domestic companies and generating 
a return on investment (ROI) for the national government’ (OECD,2019b, p. 8). Given the different 
priorities and constraints of DFIs, some have argued that big businesses in donor countries may benefit  
more than local SMEs (Mah, 2018; CONCORD, 2012). At the same time, adherence to profitability cr iter ia 
and credit ratings may imply that DFIs and private entities target existing markets or customers, 
excluding less-developed areas and potentially diminishing developmental impact on less-privileged 
markets and people. As highlighted by EURODAD (2013, p. 22) ‘Existing facilities tend to “follow the 
market” by focusing on already popular areas for investment by public and private entities’. 
A look at EDFI´s members provides further insight with regard to different priorities or objectives as 
specified by the European DFIs. For example, the Italian DFI (SIMEST) was set up to promote FDI by Italian 
companies and an Italian partner is required for SIMEST participation. The Spanish DFI (COFIDES) has  an 
explicit focus on viable private investment projects, promoting, at the same time, both development of 
recipient countries and the internationalisation of Spanish companies. The mission of the German DFI,  
DEG, which is fully owned by the state-owned development bank KfW, is to promote private-sector 
enterprises operating in developing and emerging-market countries. The priorities and mandates of DFIs  
vary and the potential conflicts this implies should be addressed as DFIs become key players in 
leveraging private finance for development, as well as within the forthcoming MFF (see Section 5).  
4.2 EU Blending Framework – Evaluation and Assessment 
Many of the criticisms and concerns raised above have also been raised in the context of the EU’s 
blending. The Evaluation on Blending report carried out on behalf of the European Commission by 
economic consultants, ADE in 2016, (European Commission, 2016a) offers a comprehensive evaluation of 
EU blended projects during 2007-2014. The report follows a methodology of evaluation provided by 
DG DEVCO guidelines, using a ‘reconstructed theory of change’ and proceeds based on nine evaluation 
questions (reproduced in Box 1). The report reaches an overall positive assessment of EU blending and 
makes a set of recommendations for improvement. A brief assessment of the report follows. This 
highlights how the evaluation report both identifies and reproduces the various shortcomings of BF 
raised in the broader literature.  
Box 1: Evaluation Questions by ADE  
(reproduced and reconstructed from European Commission, 2016a) 
Relevance pillar  Question  Attempts to Address  
EQ1 Strategic 
relevance  
To what extent is blending strategically 
relevant and valuable?  
  
EQ2 Project 
Alignment  
Has the EU proactively guided projects to 
align the portfolio with (EU) policy targets?  
Contested notion of ‘policy 
leverage’  
EQ3 Financial 
Efficiency  
Has BF used the right level of grants?  Financial additionality 
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Value-added pillar      
EQ4 Instrument  To what extent has the appropriate 
instrument (or mix therein) been selected?  
Financial additionality  
EQ5 Policy Reform  To what extent have blended projects 
contributed to leverage policy reforms in 
beneficiary countries?   
Contested notion of ‘policy 
leverage’ 
EQ6 Project quality  To what extent has blending delivered 
better quality projects, in terms of 
relevance, efficiency and effectiveness?  
Additionality and value for 
money  
Results pillar      
EQ7 Finance Barriers  To what extent has blending contributed to 
improving access to finance for MSMEs?  
Development impact indirectly  
EQ8 Aid effectiveness 
and visibility  
  
To what extent have blended projects 
promoted coordination between European 
aid actors, lowered aid transaction costs 
and enhanced visibility of EU aid?   
  
Visibility of EU, coherence and 
coordination issues, [see also the 
(CEU 2019) report]  
EQ9 Results  To what extent have blended projects 
contributed to development outcomes in 
the areas of interest and in how far have 
they benefited the poor and 
disadvantaged?  
Development impact: one 
question that tackles it directly.  
First, the report admits that determining a counterfactual to BF is hard, with accompanying problems in 
establishing additionality. The authors found it difficult to assess whether a project would have gone 
ahead without blending, and if so, what it would look like. In addition, although the evaluation reports an 
average leverage ratio of 20 for the sampled projects, at the same time, it explicitly states that the ratio 
has no implications for causality. The report also clarifies that the ratio includes the total financing against 
the EU grant, with total financing coming predominantly from European financial institutions (DFIs ,  EIP 
and EBRD) in the form of loans, but also includes contributions from multilateral agencies and public and 
private sector investors. Nonetheless, the report paints a positive picture in terms of both additionality ,  
financial efficiency and leveraging. One of the recommendations of the report (already present in the 
post-2014 application forms for EU blended projects (European Commission, 2015)), was to s trengthen 
attention to multi-dimensional additionality and leverage ratios (to justify EU support) via clear, 
standardised and measurable indicators from the design stage of projects. In other words, while the 
report identifies problems with measuring additionality and leverage ratios, it proceeds by proposing 
further standardisation and quantification of such problematic metrics. 
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Second, with regard to developmental impact, the report finds that until 2014 blended projects had 
insufficient focus on broader and longer-term development results. This was found to be the case both at 
the feasibility and design stages, as well as during implementation. In particular, it is reported that while 
the logical framework from initial planning to final results was sound, the concrete articulation of the 
‘results chain’ (from project outputs to outcomes to impacts)14 was generally insufficient. At the same 
time, there was scarce quantification of broader impacts (e.g. on poverty reduction or climate change 
mitigation) and a strong focus on outputs and outcomes of blended projects. However, as the report 
correctly points out, project outputs are generally much more standardised, specific and narrow in 
context and the connection from project outputs to developmental impacts cannot be simply assumed. 
Nonetheless, the evaluators often made such inferences (e.g. see European Commission, 2016a, p. 76).  
The report also lacks an explicit focus on pro-poor targeting and poverty reduction, rely ing instead on 
‘trickle-down’ development theories, especially for large infrastructural investments. In the few EU 
blended projects that had explicit pro-poor considerations, ADE positively evaluated them within a 
narrow frame, namely, whether the location/ theme of the project takes place within a geography with 
high poverty levels (e.g. rural areas projects or targeting of poor segments of the population). Yet, 
meaningful assessments require more qualitative and context-specific analysis. Meaningful assessments 
also require a thorough investigation of the conditions through which poor people access new facilit ies ,  
services (e.g. water or sanitation), and projects,, at what cost, and with what longer-term implications. 
Such assessments should also reflect the views of broader stakeholders, local communities and CSOs. 
The evaluators found that job creation was not part of the design of EU blended projects, and very  lit t le 
information has been provided on this front. Nonetheless, the report puts forth a series of empirical 
studies that estimate the number of jobs created by large infrastructure projects and then offers an 
estimated range of job creation for the EU blended projects, without specification of the temporality or  
conditions of the created jobs and without any data on jobs from EU BF. Another major recommendation 
of the report entails the incorporation of a stronger and clearer focus on demonstrating expected 
development impact of proposed projects. Hence, post-2014 applications forms for EU blended projects 
(European Commission, 2015) incorporate explicit indicators for, e.g. average share of population below 
the poverty line in the location of the proposed project, or, whenever possible, estimates  of jobs  to be 
generated and a focus on pro-poor risk sharing. These improve ex ante attempts to measure 
development impact, but do not address long term development impact ex post.  
Third, influencing and aligning policy reform in recipient countries is positively evaluated. However, 
within the ‘policy leverage’ debate, CSOs and others have long contested and argued against the 
emphasis on donor objectives, that may undermine recipient country’s ownership or promote different  
priorities. This issue is even more pronounced with BF settings where the priorities and mandates of 
expanded layers of intermediation vary and transparency is weak. Influencing local policies  or  inducing 
local governments to align policies and corresponding operational strategies to donors’ interests has 
been contested on the basis of reducing democratic space (e.g. EURODAD, 2013).  
Finally, it is telling what is missing from this comprehensive report, highlighting gaps in the broader 
advocacy of BF for development. First, the report is based on a somewhat ‘apolitical’  framework while,  
assuming the alignment of policy goals between the EU and beneficiary countries. There is no appraisal 
of potential discord between the targets and priorities of different actors. For an elaboration, see 
EURODAD, 2013. This is, to some extent, also present in the Council of the European Union (CEU) (2019) 
 
14 Project output refers to the specific direct deliverable (the final good or service) -e.g. a new road, project outcome to the 
uptake by beneficiaries; it is more general but still measurable and directly related to the project-e.g. how many people it is 
expected to serve. Impact or result refers to the broader, often longer-run developmental effects (e.g. poverty reduction, climate 
change mitigation, etc).  
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report and the forthcoming MFF. By attempting to address fragmentation in the current funding 
frameworks, proposals are made to consolidate decision-making to a lesser number of entities, 
potentially underestimating contestation between the actors in the BF process (see Section 5). 
Furthermore, there is little discussion of delays, cost overruns, and other problems arising during 
implementation of BF projects. There was no attempt to assess the companies undertaking the projects,  
and the views and experience of the local communities or contracted workers are left unaddressed. 
Finally, human rights and inequality are absent, while gender is mentioned only a handful of t imes . The 
centrality of gender in development as well as the gendered implications of strategies, policies and 
projects is missing from BF in general (with the exception of projects that target exactly that) and is  also 
unaddressed in the new MFF (see Section 5). 
4.3 Fragile country context 
Encouraging private finance to flow to the poorest countries is emerging as a major hurdle for the BF 
agenda. There are significant challenges to attracting investment to such contexts including weak 
institutional structures and high perceived risk. Yet the strong rhetoric persists that  attract ing pr ivate 
finance is essential to meet the SDGs in LDCs as ‘public resources alone will not be enough’ 
(OECD/UNCDF, 2019, p. 10). Catalysing private capital in post-conflict states is also associated with peace 
building (Basile and Neunuebel, 2019). According to the OECD, of the USD 157 billion in private finance 
mobilised for development from 2012 to 2017, less than a fifth (i.e. USD 28.8 billion) went to countries 
considered as fragile. Some MDBs 15 have explicitly adopted a policy to mobilise private commitments  to 
low income and fragile countries. Such commitments have not featured prominently in the strategies  of 
DFIs. Most of the private finance mobilised for fragile contexts has been through mult ilateral channels  
and the WBG accounts for over a third of all private finance mobilised in fragile settings, followed by the 
EIB. The main bilateral donors are the USA and France (Basile and Neunuebel, 2019). 
While there are vulnerable communities in LMICs and HMICs there is little evidence to indicate that these 
groups are benefitting from BF. In addition to attracting low volumes, BF project size is much smaller  in 
LICs compared with MICs (USD 14 million compared with USD 32 million and USD 84 million in LMICs and 
UMICs respectively). Figures for LIC projects are inflated because of a small number of large projects 
(Attridge and Engen, 2019). Attridge and Engen (2019) also highlight that 96.5 % of private finance 
mobilised via blending, flows to countries with a credit rating. Most LICs do not have these. Thus, 
blending finance appears to pick the ‘low hanging fruits in MICs rather than being targeted at the earliest 
stages in the investment cycle to overcome the most pervasive market failures in LICs’ (World Bank, 2018, 
p. 3). 
The poorest countries are also often financially fragile with rising debt levels. The LICs in SSA have 
recorded the fastest rise in debt levels of all regions. Some of the debt problems arise from conditions  of 
global liquidity and the movement of private capital flows to low income countries (see Bonizzi et al 
2019). High debt levels create uncertainty, deterring investment and innovation. This means that 
financial structures that create debt-like burdens on public institutions (such as a power purchase 
agreement for a private power plant) can exacerbate fiscal positions that are already under strain (EC 
2015, UNCTAD 2017, Bonizzi et al 2019, IMF, 2020). 
While blending may be oriented to development, there are indications that financing is also supporting 
strategic interests. With USA BF, mobilisation by USAID reportedly focuses on Iraq and for  OPIC (the US 
 
15 Including the IFC, the AfDB and the ADB. 
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies 
 
26 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, now known as the US Development Finance Corporation), 
mobilisation is concentrated in Pakistan, Egypt and Nigeria. For France, 70 % of mobilised private finance 
went to Cameroon, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar and Egypt, countries historically linked with France 
(Basile and Neunuebel, 2019). 
Investment in LICs (and elsewhere) is complicated by the intersections of economic wealth and polit ical 
power. Basile and Neunuebel (2019) cite a number of cases where ruling elites manipulate state 
institutions in LICs.. Economic development is undermined by illicit financial flows, which are largely 
estimated to exceed inflows of aid, and net FDI combined. However, not all investors are deterred by 
such risks. Fragile contexts involve poor regulation for workers’ rights and lack of government 
accountability. There is a high risk that this will be exploited by investors. Basile and Neunuebel (2019, 
p. 43) conclude that ‘the challenge is therefore not to attract business but the right business with the 
right motivations’. In fragile states, caution is vital to ensure that blending does not  open the gates  to 
exploitative predatory behaviour from the private sector. This is even more challenging in the context  of 
weak institutional structures. Hence, Basile and Neunuebel (2019, p. 16) call for ‘a dose of realism and a 
cautious approach’ to the use of development finance to mobilise private sector investment in high-r isk 
and low capacity fragile environments. 
4.3.1 The IDA Private Sector Window 
The World Bank has stepped up its efforts to bring private finance to fragile states. In 2017, a 
USD 2.5 billion IDA18 IFC-MIGA Private Sector Window (PSW) was established to catalyse pr ivate sector 
investment in IDA-only countries with a focus on fragile and conflict affected states (FCS). The PSW 
consists of four facilities 16: 
● Risk Mitigation Facility (RMF) to provide project based guarantees in large infrastructure projects and 
PPPs. 
● MIGA Guarantee Facility (MGF) to expand the coverage of MIGA guarantees through shared first-loss  
and risk participation. 
● Local Currency Facility (LCF) to provide long term local currency investments through IFC n countries  
where capital markets are not developed. 
● Blended Finance Facility (BFF) to blend PSW support with pioneering IFC investments across sectors 
with high development impact. 
In the mid-term review, 15 months after the window launch, there were just 12 transactions and one 
programme approved for PSW support. For these, total project financing came to USD 1 600 million and 
the private sector accounted for about half of the project finance. The 12 projects approved so far  have 
focused on SMEs, housing finance, renewable energy/ efficiency, manufacturing and telecoms. According 
to the World Bank’s mid-term review (World Bank 2018, p. 17), approximately 90 % of PSW resources 
deployed so far have involved some form of ‘embedded subsidy’. Of these estimated subsides, half was  
targeted at minimising incremental financing costs to end-clients, about 10 % was deployed to reduce 
end consumer rates, a third allowed MIGA to release some risk capital and provide excess loss coverage, 
and 15 % were ‘deployed towards enabling IFC to meet a local currency market established bond pr ice 
through concessional swap rates’. 
There have been major challenges in establishing the PSW. It is not easy to find projects to invest  in and 
‘deal origination in PSW eligible markets does not come easy’ (World Bank, 2018, p. 6). Considerable 
resources have been directed into building a pipeline of projects for PSW support. Efforts have involved 
 
16 See here for a list of IDA18 PSW approved projects: http://ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida18-replenishment/ida18-
private-sector-window/ida18-private-sector-window-projects 
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putting PSW ‘anchors’ in industry teams and country offices. The World Bank reports that very often, 
investment in fragile and conflict affected states is the result of ‘extended advisory support and 
handholding’ (World Bank, 2018, p. 8). PSW interventions in the private sector are often complementary 
to other World Bank interventions, via IDA on the public side as part of the bigger World Bank Group 
structure. Blended projects are often not conducted in isolation. For example, SME transactions often 
take place in a business environment where IDA provides broader support on improving the regulatory  
structures or provides capacity building for entrepreneurs. Similarly, attracting investment in 
infrastructure requires ‘upstream’ work to develop the regulatory structures that are conducive to private 
investment. Getting projects off the ground is resource intensive. A high number of projects are rejected. 
The Bank reports that the small deal size and the customised nature of each proposal has made LCF deals 
far more resource intensive than was originally envisaged. It takes a long time for development outcomes 
to be realised. The large number of small and diverse transactions hampers governance efficiency for the 
PSW. 
The PSW framework sets out a method for estimating concessionality ex ante. The underlying principle is  
that the PSW should provide a level of concessionality just enough to address the risk/return gaps in risky 
markets and enable the underlying private sector investment so that there is investment but not ‘market  
distortion’. For each project, the level of subsidy is estimated and submitted for board approval and 
quantified as a percentage of total project financing. A review process draws on the IFC’s Blended 
Finance Committee, where they work it out on a case by case basis taking into account the sponsor’s 
expected internal rate of return and same for return to lenders. This they do to ‘affirm that  the subs idy 
level requested is justifiable and not excessive’. If possible, they use comparator data from past and 
similar projects. This is a complex consideration combining ‘analytic tools and judgement’ (Wor ld Bank, 
2018, p. 16). 
Projects supported have been diverse including small loans, the first bond issuance in Cambodia and the 
first targeted private equity fund in the Kyrgyz Republic. However, and echoing from above, the World 
Bank also reports difficulties and limitations in establishing additionality. The PSW uses the IFC’s 
Anticipated Impact Measurement and Monitoring Framework to assess additionality. The World Bank (2018) 
in the mid-term evaluation of the PSW, claims that ‘strong development impact is expected’ (p. i), 
particularly in the realm of SME financing with over 25 000 SMEs to be reached through risk sharing 
facilities. In practice, however, and similar to the experiences reported in the evaluation of EU blending 
projects discussed above (European Commission, 2016a), judgement is required in assess ing if there is  
sufficient additionality to merit PSW financing and support. This might be more obvious in some cases , 
for example, if there are very high political risks in a country in state of civil unrest, but the counterfactual 
is often difficult to prove. Moreover, it might be difficult to demonstrate significant mobilisation of 
private finance in the context of an individual project, but the success of one project may lead to s imilar  
projects in the future with scale additionality being demonstrated over time. Expectations of market 
creation may not always be realistic, and evidence is difficult to show in the short term. As with 
concessionality, the Bank’s position is that such assessments require judgements and they will be often 
influenced by the experience and institutional perspective of the project reviewers. 
Critics have been concerned about lack of transparency regarding the PSW, saying that it relies on secret  
negotiations with select beneficiary firms with no documented justification for the negotiated subsidy as  
an efficient mechanism to achieve public policy objectives. Kenny (2019) also makes the point that 
blending options more generally are restricted to the areas and mechanisms in which client firms want to 
invest. In October 2019, the CEO of the IFC committed to publicly disclosing the estimated subsidy for 
each project and justification for why it was necessary (Le Houerou, 2019). This was in response to a 
threat from the Chair of the US House Committee on Financial Services to withhold financial support 
because the PSW was subsidising private firms without competition based on unsolicited proposals 
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(Igoe, 2019). The World Bank IDA19 pledged to continue to fund the PSW at the same level with 
USD 2.6billion, despite the low amounts disbursed (Edwards, 2019).  
5 Evaluation of EU MFF 2021-2027 and external financing 
instruments 
5.1 New External instruments in the MFF 2021-2027 
In May 2018, the EC published proposals for EU’s next long term budget, MFF17. This is  subdivided into 
headings that cover broad policy areas. External action comes under Heading 6, titled Neighbourhood and 
the World with a budget of EUR 123 billion. Under this heading, the EU is proposing a major restructuring 
of the Union’s external action instruments.  
The MFF proposals build on positive findings regarding leverage effects from the European Commiss ion 
blending evaluation report (European Commission, 2016a), discussed in section 4, the 2014-2020 MFF 
mid-term review and the EU’s history with BF. European Commission (2016b) concluded that, while 
external financing instruments were generally fit for purpose, more resources were needed and there was 
a need for flexibility, simplification, coherence and performance. A fragmented approach had led to a 
complex set of instruments and streamlining was recommended (see also CEU 2019). As discussed, many 
of these suggestions were enacted with the creation of the EIP and the EFSD in 2017, whose structure the 
new MFF largely keeps, but substantially scales up.  
The changing structure of the EU’s external instruments reflects the shifting global context to include 
migration, climate change, instability in the EU’s immediate periphery and a push for greater EU influence 
on changing global issues (European Parliament 2019a, p. 5). The aim is to ‘make the Union better 
equipped to pursue its goals and project its interests, policies and values globally’ (European Commission 
2018b, p. 18)18. The new architecture also ‘reflects the need to focus on strategic priorities both 
geographically – the European Neighbourhood, Africa and the Western Balkans as well as countries  that 
are fragile and most in need, but also thematically – security, migration, climate change and human 
rights’ (European Commission 2018b, p. 18)19. This refocusing has increased militarisation in the control 
and prevention of people entering Europe, with many negative effects (see Benedicto and Brunet, 2018). 
The MFF proposes bringing together most of its existing stand-alone external financing instruments into 
a single one - the ‘Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument’ (NDICI) with 
a budget of EUR 89.2 billion. This will also integrate the European Development Fund (EDF) which is 
currently the biggest EU external financing fund, managed by the Commission with a budget of 
EUR 30.5 billion but has been outside the EU budget and MFF 20. Including the EDF in the budget is 
expected to increase efficiency and effectiveness of EU development aid and strengthen Parliament’s 
oversight. The programme is flexible with higher levels of allocation that can be shifted across headings . 
The NDICI will formally integrate and scale up the EIP.  
 
17 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:c2bc7dbd-4fc3-11e8-be1d-
01aa75ed71a1.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF last consulted on 6 February 2020. 
18 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:c2bc7dbd-4fc3-11e8-be1d-
01aa75ed71a1.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF last consulted on 6 February 2020. 
19 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:c2bc7dbd-4fc3-11e8-be1d-
01aa75ed71a1.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF last consulted on 6 February 2020. 
20 See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/644173/EPRS_BRI(2019)644173_EN.pdf last consulted on 6 
February 2020. 
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NDICI has a three-pillar structure with some flexibility between headings21:  
● Geographic programmes EUR 68bn 
o Neighbourhood – EUR 22bn 
o SSA – EUR 32bn 
o Asia and the Pacific – EUR 10bn 
o Americas and the Caribbean – EUR 4bn 
● Thematic programmes EUR 7bn 
o Human rights and democracy EUR 1.5bn 
o Civil society orgs – EUR 1.5bn 
o Stability and peace – EUR 1bn 
o Global challenges – EUR 3bn 
● Rapid response actions EUR 4bn  
The geographical programmes have far-reaching objectives and are intended to: promote good 
governance, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and employment, security and peace, protect  
the rule of law, human rights, human development and the environment, eradicate poverty, fight 
inequality and address issues related to migration and climate change. Thematic issues are 
complementary and are linked to the pursuit of the SDGs. Rapid response actions complement both 
geographic and thematic programmes.  
Crucially, the NDICI will finance an expanded EFSD+, which would fold in all the regional blending 
facilities, and the EFSD. The EFSD+, as discussed in section 3, will effectively become a single wor ldwide 
blending facility for all DFIs and development banks seeking financial support from the EU. The EFSD+ 
financing mechanisms will include grants, loans, guarantees, equity or quasi equity, investments or 
participations, risk sharing instruments, and budgetary guarantees. The NDICI proposal specifies that 
attention must be given to fragile and conflict affected countries (Bilal 2019).  
Within the EFSD+, there will be the new External Action Guarantee (EAG) with a ceiling of EUR 60 billion 
which would replace all existing guarantee systems and will be open to all European development 
institutions. While the guarantee would cover loans up to EUR 60 billion, the ‘provisioning rate’ ranges  
from 9 % to 50 %. This is the proportion of loans actually covered by the guarantee, so a 9 % provision for  
a guarantee means the guarantee by the EU is up to 9 % of the value of the loan. This suggest, then, that 
the value of guarantees could be between EUR 5.4 and EUR 30 billion.  
The NDICI is to be a single instrument that will ring-fence allocations per geographical region including 
the Neighbourhood and Africa. The new external investment architecture will therefore try to ‘crowd in’ 
additional resources from other donors and from the private sector. The system intends  to provide an 
extensive range of financial instruments across diverse settings with varying degrees of concessionality  
and flexibility to suit specific situations.  
5.2 Concerns 
While the new structure for EU External Financing Instruments (EFIs) proposed under  NDICI provides  a 
welcome simplification and streamlining of EU investing activities, the European Parliament, academics  
and civil society have raised a number of concerns regarding its scale and implementation. Although the 
NDICI should bring significant advantages, creating an instrument of such scale raises questions about its 
management and accountability structures.  
 
21 See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/644173/EPRS_BRI(2019)644173_EN.pdf last consulted on 6 
February 2020. 
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The European Parliament is clearly aware of the risks posed by the proposals for EFSD+ and the EAG, as  
referenced in the European Parliament Texts Adopted P8_TA(2019)0298, referred to here as EP (2019a). 
These texts incorporate additional measures to ensure that the instrument is oriented towards 
eradicating poverty and promoting equality and human rights. In addition, the document calls for a 
number of measures to increase transparency and accountability in the EFIs under the NDICI, including a 
grievance and redress system, a scoreboard of indicators to guide project selection and a strategic board 
to manage EFSD+ (Article 27a). Most notably, the Parliament proposes that the amount that can be used 
for the EFSD+ External Guarantee Scheme is capped at EUR 10 billion. There is, then, considerable 
awareness of the issues pertaining to the NDICI and these will not be repeated here. Instead, this sect ion 
points to broader concerns raised by the proposals in light of the wider findings regarding blending 
highlighted above. 
5.2.1 Transparency and accountability  
As shown in Section 4, transparency and accountability are weak in BF structures and the proposals  for  
the NDICI are no exception. The NDICI in part aims to bring flexibility into BF arrangements. Past financial 
allocations for external development have been described as ‘defined rigidly along thematic and 
geographic axes and made available under restrictive terms and a complex set of rules, often caus ing a 
slow roll out’ (CEU 2019, p. 20). However, the shift to more flexible structures raises a set of concerns 
regarding how funds will be managed and facilities governed.  
First, it is not yet clear what the actual size of the resources committed by the EU to BF projects ,  or  their  
structure and allocation will be. The new EFSD+ will be mainly financed through the NDICI instrument. 
However, it is unclear whether the EFSD+ will use the entire amount of the instrument, nor how much it  
will mobilise. Since the NDICI reflects an intention to increase reliance on blending and guarantees, as 
much as 100 % of the instrument could theoretically be disbursed through the EFSD+ despite the fact 
that the modality is untested (Concorde /Eurodad, 2018). 
Second, there are also potential concerns about the scale of the EAG. As discussed, it is mentioned that 
up to EUR 60 billion loans could be part of the guarantee programme. Nevertheless, it is unclear precisely  
what size the programme will have with such a wide range for the provisioning rate (9 % to 50 %). Some 
estimates suggest EUR 10-15 billion (Bilal, 2019), but this currently remains unspecified. This would be a 
substantial share of the NDICI EUR 68 billion geographic programme. It is welcome that the European 
Parliament is calling for a maximum of an initial EUR 10 billion for the EAG (EP, 2019). Third, a related 
concern is the scope of the guarantee programme: while the EAG is supposed to be extended to all 
potential DFIs, it is not yet clear whether it will replace, remain integrated with, or be separate from, the 
existing EU-EIB guarantee arrangements. 
Fourth, there is no specific information regarding the allocation targets of the EFSD+. The current 
facilities are separate entities with separate budgets. As they become regional ‘platforms’ within the 
EFSD+, it is important to understand how geographical allocations will be met. In particular, given the 
attempt to fulfil both DG DEVCO and DG Neighbourhood objectives, it is not clear how much of the funds 
will be directed to development needs of the poorest, and which targets will be set to achieve these. 
Fifth, it is unclear how existing facilities and guarantee instruments, which seem to be excluded by the 
EFSD+, will feature within the new scheme. It appears that the WBIF will remain outside the scheme and 
financed by the Instrument of Pre-Accession, but this raises questions about whether WBIF projects  will 
remain completely separate from the EFSD+ and the EAG. Similar considerations apply to sectoral 
allocations, where no details exist regarding targeting of particular sectors. 
The use of development funds for de-risking private investment 
 
31 
In addition, there are concerns regarding the overall governance structure of the instrument. The Report 
of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board22, whilst issuing a ‘positive with reservations’ opinion of the NDICI, raises  
concerns regarding the governance structure and that the NDICI proposals do not sufficiently explain 
how future monitoring and evaluation would work. There is a lack of specifics regarding the types of 
governance envisaged. Power over the EFSD+ appears effectively to be centralised in the Commission. 
This raises questions regarding the capacity of the Commission to manage the whole process, calling for  
the need for independent expertise as well as the implementation of appropriate accountability of EFSD+ 
operations.  
More broadly, there is a distinct lack of transparency regarding the existing blending operations by the 
EU. While there is available information regarding the list of existing projects, there is at present no clear  
framework for the evaluation of their impact. Without clear targets and an explicit governance strategy, 
it becomes difficult to assess performance. Finally, there is a trade-off between complexity and 
accountability: under current proposals it is not possible to follow what funds will go where, let alone 
how they will be monitored.  
5.2.2 Ambition and additionality in practice 
There is a remarkable disconnect between the high-level ambitions of BF and what has been achieved in 
practice. The small amounts raised to date are in stark contrast to the high expectations with which 
blending is associated. As often stated, the blending agenda calls for mobilising untapped private 
resources to plug the USD 2.5 trillion development financing gap to achieve the SDGs. For the EU, 
the focus on blending has so far meant primarily working with public agencies but there are calls for 
private investment to be stepped up in order to achieve development goals. For example, in a mid-term 
review of the current MFF, the European Commission (2016b, p. 10) states that ‘a much greater role must 
be given to private investors looking for new investment opportunities in emerging markets’. The report  
has high expectations of this policy, suggesting that the proposals of EIP - including the increased 
support for private finance - would ‘tackle the root causes of migration and support partners to manage 
its consequences while contributing to the achievement of other development goals’ (European 
Commission 2016b, p. 10). The EIP has been described as ‘hugely aspirational’ with multiple object ives . 
These include: leveraging high volumes of investment; attracting additional investors via demonstrat ion 
impact to lower perceived risks; reaching the poorest and most fragile countries; improving the pipeline 
of bankable development projects; encouraging innovation; fostering greater cooperation among 
partner governments, the private sector, civil society and development actors towards an enabling 
business environment; and changing the way EU institutions, donors and DFIs work together with a view 
to promoting greater coherence and synergy towards achieving the SDGs (Gavas and Timmis, 2019). The 
EC predicts that the new blending arrangements could mobilise an additional investment of half a trillion 
euros over the period 2021-2027 (Gavas and Timmis, 2019; European Commission, 2018e). 
However, the scale of these objectives are inconsistent with what has happened in practice. Despite 
extensive efforts, the amounts raised by BF are small. As indicated in section 3, despite the creat ion of 
regional platforms, while public finance has been mobilised, for example, via DFIs, there has been lit t le 
private sector mobilisation despite the instruments available, although this is expected to increase. 
These objectives are patently unrealistic. Another issue with the scale of ambition from EU blending is  
that there are trade-offs and tensions in these goals. For example, reaching fragile states is incompatible 
with high volumes of investment. In this context, Gavas and Timmis (2019) point out that it is unclear  if 
the EFSD is intended to be primarily a high leverage fund — mobilising the maximum quantity of 
 
22 European Commission 2018. 
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investment for a given input of EU resources — or a high risk fund mobilising investment for under-
served markets with low risk-adjusted returns. 
All development agencies report low levels of blending disbursements (Section 2). Implementation of 
blending places high demand on the relevant institutions. Determining a level of concessionality that 
reaches the right balance of attracting finance without tipping into unnecessary subsidy requires high 
levels of skill as well as extensive knowledge of the financial positions of all agents in the transactions. 
This is just to achieve a blending transaction. Achieving development additionality is even more 
demanding. As we have discussed, across the board, additionality tends to be assumed rather than 
established. Largely missing from the BF policy toolbox is an analysis of the pathways by which project  
activities will bring long term benefits to the communities in which they are located.  
Yet, despite the overall vagueness of what is being pursued, there is a sense of urgency. The narrative is  
that the EU needs to roll out blending as quickly as possible given the complex and fragile s ituat ion in 
many of the neighbouring countries and Africa. According to the CEU report, (commenting on the 
external financing plans, not explicitly on blending) ‘lack of urgent action would present substantial 
risks for the EU’s main policy goals on development, growth, fighting climate change and the overall 
global standing of the EU’ (CEU 2019, p. 10).  
This emphasis on urgency risks rolling out blending operations without due regard to the specifics  of 
objectives and pathways to impact. Indeed, a European Parliament Briefing cited a review of EU EFIs 
which ‘admitted that measuring the long term impact of the EFI’s implementation is difficult but 
stressed that non-action or late action in external relations would be costly if instability and conflicts 
increase with potential spill-over effects for the EU’ (European Parliament 2019b, p. 4).  
A particular risk in these respects is that this urgency puts excessive focus on involving the private sector,  
as increasing resources are aimed at de-risking its contribution as opposed to other objectives. This 
relates to the point of opportunity costs (see 4.1.1 above). ODA has a specific mandate. Inevitably  there 
are trade-offs. Using ODA for blending is less likely to reach social sectors (Meeks et al., 2020). Such 
decisions need to be in the context of a full transparent appraisal of the alternative use of ODA funds. 
While private sector involvement is an explicit EIP and EFSD objective, it is important that this  does not  
override wider development objectives, in line with concerns raised by CSOs and others (Section 4). 
To the extent that private sector financiers are involved, there is considerable difficulty in adequately 
ascertaining whether they may have financed projects at market rates regardless of the blending 
facilities. In other words, it is not clear whether this is additional mobilised private finance, or simply 
private finance which has in effect gained at the expense of the EU system by relying on concessional 
financing that could have been used in a better way. 
Continuing down this parallel path of expecting blending to achieve great things at speed, but without 
specifics to drill down to practice runs the risk of pushing projects through that will have little 
beneficiary impact on recipient communities. A multiplicity of objectives risks confusing and obscur ing 
the development priorities — that should be the focus of ODA spending — discussed more in the 
following section.  
5.2.3 Developmental impact 
Concessional finance needs to be directed to those most in need. According the CEU report (2019, p. 12) 
‘the ultimate aim of development finance should be to achieve tangible and lasting development 
impact’. As evidenced in Section 4, there is a large literature that points to the deficiency of frameworks  
for BF in reaching the poorer and more fragile states, and the scarce evidence of long-term development 
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impacts. As one of the latest OECD (2018, p. 140)23 reports attests: ‘Little reliable evidence has been 
produced linking initial blending efforts with proven development results’. Furthermore, the EP and CSOs 
have expressed concerns regarding the developmental impact of the new proposed architecture 
(Concord/ Eurodad, 2018). CSOs have raised concerns that the new financing instrument will increase the 
risk of development cooperation becoming secondary to self-interested foreign policy and divert aid 
from poverty eradication (see also Section 4 and Concord 2018).  
As noted in the literature above, additionality from blending often tends to be assumed rather than 
properly assessed. Yet, there are major challenges in reaching poor communities with BF and even more 
so in ensuring that these projects contribute to long term benefits. The absence of clear goals and targets 
outlined above raises the risk of fewer funds reaching LDCs. Without any pressure or incentives, DFIs  are 
unlikely to undertake more complex programmes. While DFIs are development agencies, they may have 
to protect their own credit ratings and profitability. That leads to an inevitable bias away from high r isk  
investments. Instead of directing activities towards development outcomes, there is  a  s trong r isk  that  
they may ‘simply use the EFSD’s risk-sharing tools to increase the expected return of investment that is  
slightly suboptimal or, worse, already commercially viable’ (Gavas and Timmis, 2019, p. 9). 
Thus, clear targets for reaching marginalised communities are required if development impact is  to be 
ensured. Building on the discussion in Section 4 and the insufficient focus on development impact of 
current EU blended projects (EC, 2016), a tighter link between blending mechanisms and tangible 
developmental targets as proposed in the EP Texts Adopted (EP, 2019a) is welcome. Too often, targets 
and evaluations focus on achieving financial close with insufficient regard for the broader considerations 
for long-term sustainable development as well as for recipient communities’ participation in project 
design and implementation. Specific measures could be introduced, such as fostering a focus  on us ing 
local private sector partners to raise developmental impacts and local ownership and engagement.  
The next stage of EU blending is likely to lead to greater interaction with private capital. However, 
private sector firms may pursue exploitative practices in the name of profit maximisation. The evidence 
of corporate lobbyists in the EU acting to secure corporate gain at the expense of the collective or social 
good is amply documented (see the work of Corporate European Observatory)24. CEU (2019, p. 20) 
reports that ‘in terms of expertise, the European Commission lacks extensive experience in dealing with 
the private sector and has limited banking and risk-management knowledge’. They consider  that  the 
NDICI reforms will improve coordination and governance to increase flexibility but ‘its plans to develop 
financial expertise such as risk management and pricing of collateral guarantees internally need further 
work’ (CEU, 2019, p. 24). This is particularly significant with the private sector gearing up for blending 
opportunities. Management of private sector contracts is institutionally challenging for  public bodies  
that lack commercial expertise. For example, a review of PPPs in the UK by the National Audit Office 
questioned the state’s ability to manage contracts due to its comparative lack of commercial sk ills  in 
relation to those of the private sector (NAO, 2011). There needs to be adequate capacity to deal with the 
private sector both within the EU and in recipient countries.  
Finally, blending places greater emphasis on the private sector, when public services typically play a 
major role in achieving equitable social and economic development. While blending may have a positive 
role to play in the context of a broader developmental policy, this must not be at the expense of direct  
ODA support for public services. Blending must bring additionality in order to be justified. The EU 
guidelines, for example suggest that ‘blending could also add value in social sectors such as  education 
 
23 The report is based on a survey of 17 DAC members, and a 2017 OECD survey that includes 167 facilities and 189 funds 
engaged in BF during 2000-2016.  
24 For details of Corporate Lobbying in the EU see: https://corporateeurope.org/en/lobbying-the-eu  
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and health with lower financial leverage through the introduction of innovative financing mechanisms or 
by driving private sector involvement’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 5). We would want to see 
safeguards to ensure that such an approach would not undermine the state health sector. Similarly, there 
is a recognised need for the promotion of internationally agreed goals in education with particular focus  
on free public education systems (EP, 2019, p. 213). Care, then, needs to be taken to ensure that blending 
does not detract from this by inadvertently promoting private education. The International Finance 
Facility for Education for example, is aiming to pool donor resources and use public sector  financing to 
leverage private sector funds with a view to generating around USD 10 billion in additional funding for  
education 25. Such ventures risk diverting scarce public funds to attracting private investors  rather than 
investing directly in public education. Any benefits from blending in such circumstances would need to 
be carefully assessed. 
Overall, then, we are concerned about the degree to which the current and proposed financing 
instruments for the EU will achieve development results. The significant reorientation of EU ODA to 
supporting private investments raises considerable risks that this will be directed to wealthier countr ies  
and support private sector subsidies. 
  
 
25 https://sdg.iisd.org/news/international-finance-facility-for-education-prepares-to-launch/ 
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6 Conclusions 
The EU plays a major role in the global development finance landscape and is a BF pioneer. Its  blending 
operations are carried out via an extensive network of partnerships with multilateral and bilateral 
financial institutions, which are important implementing partners of the EU development budget, as  co-
financers, and as providers of technical assistance for EU-funded development projects (CEU, 2019).  The 
Commission’s proposals to boost support for BF in the coming MFF are in keeping with growing support 
for such mechanisms across the donor policy and finance communities. The Tri Hata Karana Roadmap for  
BF was launched during the IMF / World Bank Meetings in Bali in October 2018. The aim is to bring 
together key partners from governments, international organisations, development financiers and 
private sector to provide ‘shared values for all stakeholders engaged in supporting private sector projects 
for development and achieving the SDGs’ (Tri Hata Karana Roadmap, 2018, p. 5). The regional 
development banks support blending, not least to combat climate change, and increased private sector  
engagement is seen as critical to economic and social development.  
However, as our report has shown, BF comes in different shapes and sizes and it is difficult  to draw firm 
conclusions regarding its effectiveness as a development tool. There are, however, some general 
conclusions that can be made: 
Confusion: Blending has acquired extensive objectives across development agencies. Yet its  t rajectory  
has been uneven with the term applied to numerous transaction types. There is extensive confusion and 
contradictory material regarding its meaning and measurement let alone its impact. There is no clear and 
consistent picture of how much finance is mobilised or how much ODA is being invested. As Attridge and 
Engen (2019) point out, this is at odds with the BF principles established by the OECD that call for 
transparency and accountability. In the current EU proposals, there is little clarity about the budget of the 
new BF facilities to support its developmental goals. 
Scale: BF has failed to mobilise finance on the scale required to meet development challenges. Estimates 
vary regarding how much has been mobilised by blending but the most generous global estimate which 
comes from the OECD puts this at USD 157 billion over the past six years, so an average of USD 26 billion 
a year. The EU’s BF operations collectively mobilised finance worth EUR 71.27 billion during 2007-2018, 
on the basis of EUR 6.63 billion of public funds, although up until 2016 there was a noticeable lack of any 
contribution from private sector financiers in EU blended projects (Section 3). These amounts are far from 
the USD 2.5 trillion global financing gap and so, to date, the amounts raised from blending seem 
marginal rather than transformational. It is unclear whether the scale-up proposed by the EU would 
manage to achieve the current objective of EUR 500 billion for the next MFF transformation. BF ambitions 
may need to be scaled down. 
Destination countries and sectors: Most blending transactions take place in UMICs (64 % according to 
OECD data). Very little of the funds raised have reached the LDCs. Similarly, the sectors attract ing most  
finance are finance and infrastructure. For the EU, these correspond to transport, energy and private 
sector development (according to our analysis in section 3). Private capital tends to flow to sectors  with 
clear revenue streams. Very little is reaching social sectors. As Convergence (2019, p. 9) points out: 
‘Blended finance can only address a subset of SDG targets that are investable’. 
Implementation challenges: The European Commission (2016a) Evaluation Report on EU blended 
projects during 2007-2014 identifies a set of challenges with project implementation and development 
impact. Globally, BF projects in LICs have been difficult to set up. For the World Bank PSW, projects in 
fragile countries are resource intensive to establish and tend to be achieved by combining the 
experience of the different World Bank Group entities (IDA, MIGA and IFC). These projects are smaller 
than in other locations. In the EU case, BF projects have struggled to get private financiers to contribute. 
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Additionality is unproven and developmental impact weak: Donor spending needs tight scrutiny but 
tick-boxing exercises are not sufficient. An assessment of development outcomes does not easily fit  into 
such a structure. These are highly context-specific. A renewable power plant in one location may have 
vastly different impacts from one situated elsewhere. Similarly, boosting finance for SMEs is not 
necessarily a guarantee of developmental benefits. It takes time to fully observe the impacts of projects.  
Some investments in the long term may be associated with fiscal outflows and employment effects  may 
be short-lived. Across developmental agencies, it is clear that additionality is unknown and to some 
degree unknowable. This is in large part because of the absence of a counterfactual, but this has not 
impeded the rolling-oout of blending. As mentioned, evaluators usually assume positive project 
outcomes. 
Overall, far more needs to be done to unpack the full developmental outcomes from blending. Achieving 
BF projects inevitably means packaging development needs in a way that suits investors  and caters  to 
large corporate interests, and there is a strong possibility that this will be prioritised over the interests  of 
those in the communities where the projects are established. Blending uses scarce ODA to create 
attractive investment climates. The question remains as to whether this is the best use of donor funds . 
The EU as a major contributor to the international development arena and to BF, as one modality of aid, 
is well positioned to move forward with developing a common understanding and refined framework  of 
blending, incorporating necessary improvements, while realising limitations and coordinating with other 
agencies in this area.  
The use of development funds for de-risking private investment 
 
37 
7 Policy Recommendations 
Overall our conclusion is that the evidence on the developmental impact of BF is limited and a set of 
challenges still need to be fully understood and addressed. While some projects in some cases bring 
benefits to some parties, this is uneven. This is not to say that blending is necessarily  good or  bad, but  
that arguments for its use need to be made on a case by case basis. Our research found that the evidence 
on blending was far less substantial than the policy hubris would indicate. Continuing to suggest that it is 
only through blending that the SDGs can be reached raises potential risks of pushing projects through 
without proper assessment, and of a narrow focus on revenue flows without sufficient regard to wider  
long-term developmental impact. Public and private sources of finance are not substituting and each has 
associated costs and future financial flows. BF needs to be understood as one of a range of financing 
mechanisms rather than being elevated to the main such mechanism. The EU is a major player in 
development policy and has been at the forefront of BF, so it is well placed to take the lead in addressing 
some of the confusions and contradictions that pervade the BF agenda. We propose some specific 
actions below.  
7.1 Improve transparency and clarity 
Increased transparency in BF has been a long-standing civil society demand. However , t ransparency is  
lagging considerably with insufficient publicly available information and data. This hinders accountability 
of BF and scrutiny by independent and public organisations. Blending programmes should operate with 
greater disclosure and transparency, allowing for public oversight as well as clear complaints 
mechanisms. The same should apply to the process of approving projects within the MFF which should 
incorporate disclosure of information on private companies and partnerships within approved blended 
projects.  
The design of BF facilities, as envisaged by the new MFF, needs to provide specific targets and 
objectives. More clarity is needed regarding the funds dedicated to the budget and scope of the EFSD+ 
and associated EAG. Greater clarity regarding design and implementation is particularly important given 
the current 'urgency' associated with the deployment of BF projects. We recommend:  
• Greater disclosure of the details of the funding mechanisms and their governance structures.  
• Full disclosure of selected projects for blending, including the evaluation criteria and the reasons for  
the final selection. 
• Full disclosure of EU blended project subsidies and a full exposition of their rationale in accordance 
with the commitments made by recently the CEO of the IFC.  
• Full transparency and information on materialised costs, cost overruns and delays of projects as  well 
as publicly available information on project financial outflows. 
7.2 Focus on developmental objectives 
Blending brings together a range of agents with competing and contradictory incentives, mandates and 
priorities. Although the realities are often more complex, put simply, the private sector is seeking profits  
and the public or developmental body is seeking a social outcome. The picture is also complicated by 
development institutions that have their own incentive structures, which may be to disburse funds and 
to see projects move forward, as well as by complex layers of intermediation. The essence of the blending 
ethos is that developmental needs can be packaged in a way that creates a commercial business interest  
for private investors. Clearly, such a contractual structure inevitably requires negotiating the tensions and 
contradictions of the contested interests of stakeholders. Despite efforts to address  this,  it  is  not  clear  
whether and how developmental outcomes will be prioritised. Added to this are additional objectives 
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that are loaded onto the blending agenda. For example, the EU blending guide lists five objectives 
(financial leverage; non-financial leverage; policy leverage; aid effectiveness and visibility). The reach of 
blended objectives is also extended further with claims that blending will resolve the financing needs  of 
the SDGs.  
We recommend that the focus of blending needs to be oriented towards developmental objectives. 
Rather than targeting leverage and additionality per se, project design should put primary focus on the 
developmental goals expected to be achieved, and the pathways towards them should be spelled out  
explicitly.  
7.3 Focus on developmental impact 
Our report has shown that the evidence of BF impact on development is limited, while blended projects  
have paid insufficient attention to developmental results. Evaluation of development impact is crucial to 
both our understanding of BF as a viable financing modality for development and as part of assessing the 
‘success’ of individual blended projects: what worked, what did not and through which processes. 
Currently, there is no clear evaluation strategy, and this is also hindered by lack of information, data and 
transparency. Internal monitoring and evaluation systems differ according to the governance structure of 
blended mechanisms, and are not always present or independent, nor are all made publicly available. For 
EU BF, monitoring and evaluation is the responsibility of the lead financial institution. Recognising that 
development challenges are often intractable and rooted in long histories of complex social and political 
relations, the approach to blending needs to entail qualitative, along with quantitative, aspects of 
developmental effects (e.g. on poverty reduction, gender and other inequality reduction, climate change 
mitigation, job creation, human rights etc), as well engagement of local communities. These issues 
should be at the forefront of both project design, planning, execution and evaluation to ensure that local 
needs are addressed, enhancing recipient ownership and long-term improvements. 
Key issues that should be integrated into development impact criteria and evaluations include:  
Opportunity costs of development finance: BF uses scarce aid resources with costs attached in terms of 
developmental projects not carried out.  
Context: The full developmental impact goes beyond the project itself to the wider sectorial context. For  
example, private sector cherry picking of more profitable aspects of provisioning could lead to increased 
strain on public services.  
Long term impacts: In the long run, blended projects will be associated with financial outflows. 
Employment effects may have been short term.  
Distributional impacts: Does the project reach the most marginalised? Does it provide what they need? 
How does it affect them financially? What impacts does it have on gender, inequalities, human rights, and 
climate sustainability?  
We recommend a detailed systematic review and assessment of different methodologies for evaluating 
developmental impact such as the IFC’s Anticipated Impact Measurement and Monitoring system, as well 
as those of the EU as discussed in Section 4 and in OECD (2019b). A detailed qualitative and quantitat ive 
analysis of the ways in which projects are conceived, designed, implemented, monitored and assessed by 
different agencies will form a robust basis for moving forward with BF. This will lead to a tailored 
approach to blending instruments that will be better able to suit specific needs. 
The monitoring and ex-post evaluation of developmental impact are of equal importance. We 
recommend full, transparent and independent monitoring of outcomes and evaluation of impacts 
during and beyond the duration of blended projects. Building from the knowledge of the previous 
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recommendation, the EU needs to consider the development of an all-encompassing evaluation system 
for all its blended operations. 
7.4 Assessing additionality? 
Additionality is a complex theoretical concept and its operationalisation has been difficult and contested. 
This is clearly challenging for all development institutions for both financial and development 
additionality, in terms of both project justification and ex-post evaluation. There is a strong emphasis  on 
devising objectively measurable indicators, particularly at the onset of blended projects, and much less  
emphasis on assessing additionality once the projects are complete. The World Bank notes in the review 
of the PSW that assessing additionality and concessionality of blended projects in fragile contexts  was  a 
question of judgement. Similarly, EBRD (2018, p. iv) asserts that ‘because the definition is not one against  
which projects can be rigorously measured for compliance, each additionality assessment is essentially  a 
judgment’. While these reflect a far more truthful perspective, the issue remains problematic and 
subjective. Following from recommendations in 7.2, we propose to embed ‘additionality’ within the 
broader developmental objectives and impacts, as well as within the entire process of blended projects.  
7.5 Elevate the role of recipient country stakeholders 
Recipient country stakeholders should feature more prominently in project design implementat ion and 
evaluation. The views of local parliaments, local communities and CSOs should be included at all s tages  
of the blended projects. 
7.6 Safeguard the position of public services within blending finance 
There are real risks from blending that go beyond simple project failure. Given the growing pos it ion of 
the private sector within BF and its de-risking mechanisms, and the concerns raised in this report and the 
broader literature, it is of paramount importance to ensure that the public sector is also supported. Public 
services are essential to achieving equitable social and economic development. While blending may have 
a place in the context of a broader developmental policy, this should not be at the expense of investment 
in public services, particularly in social sectors such as national health systems and free public educat ion 
systems.  
We recommend that development financing ensure protection and reinforcement of public services.  
7.7 Reconsider approach to LDCs and fragile states 
The challenges in implementing blending projects in fragile and low income states are well documented. 
Many factors make these locations unattractive to private financiers and the costs of de-risking are high. 
As a result, relatively few projects have been implemented in these locations. The mid-term review of the 
World Bank’s PSW found that such transactions were substantially more challenging than anticipated 
and, where successful, tended to build on pre-existing, on-going complementary ODA-financed World 
Bank projects.  
In such contexts, the concessions required to induce private investments are higher, the resources 
required to instigate projects are more extensive and the safeguards for workers and for the regulatory  
environment is weaker than in countries that are more stable and with higher income levels. 
The experience of the World Bank also highlights concerns regarding transparency and accountability  
with the PSW. The opportunity costs of using ODA to de-risk investment opportunities will be substantial 
and a potential distraction from using development finance directly to boost social and economic 
structures.  
We recommend that considerable caution be observed in extending BF, rather than ODA, to the LDCs  
and fragile states. Such projects are resource intensive and, from the experience of the PSW, work best as  
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part of a wider donor network, with a more extensive resource base than just the BF facility itself.  Where 
BF projects emerge from pre-existing EU activity in a locality, this may be an appropriate use of EU funds  
(subject to the improved scrutiny levels recommended above). However, rather than pushing to 
accelerate blending in low income countries and fragile states, it may be more appropriate for  greater  
attention to be given to grant financing for development.  
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